This report is an independent, non-commissioned piece of work by the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, an independent think-tank doing legal research to help make better laws.
Vedika Mittal Kumar is a Senior Resident Fellow and Lead (Competition) at the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.

Manjushree RM is a Research Fellow (Competition) at the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.

The authors would like to thank Shehnaz Ahmed (Senior Resident Fellow and Lead, Fintech) and Jai Vipra (Senior Resident Fellow, Centre for Applied Law and Technology Research) for their invaluable inputs.

The authors also acknowledge the excellent research assistance provided by our interns, Anuradha Bhattacharya (University College London) and Isha Ahlawat (Jindal Global Law School).
Preface

One of the most significant developments in the global economy over the last two decades has been the emergence of digital platforms. The COVID-19 pandemic has further cemented our reliance on digital platforms for buying goods and services, meeting people, accessing information and working amidst lockdowns and social distancing rules. This Working Paper centers on certain attributes of digital platforms that serve as E-marketplaces. E-marketplace platforms essentially act as facilitators of online connections between buyers and sellers of goods and services. As the facilitator, the platform decides the rules for the market on which buyers and sellers operate. Resultantly, by design, the platform occupies a more advantageous position than its users, who in effect might only accept the terms pre-formulated by the platform. Therefore, contrary to the pre-platform era where buyer-seller relationships were bipartite, there is now a need to acknowledge the all-important gatekeeper role played by platforms transforming commerce to a tripartite arrangement.

This paper examines contestability in the market for e-commerce platforms and fairness in the relationship between these platforms and their business users/sellers. As these platforms have prospered in market share, they have struggled to keep up with the initial promise of growth for their business users. Consequently, most business users and trade bodies in the country today are highly ambivalent towards digital platforms. Sporadic efforts have been attempted to address concerns raised by business users of digital platforms via the consolidated Foreign Direct Investment Policy, the Draft E-commerce Policy, 2019, the Consumer Protection (E-commerce) Rules, 2020, the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines And Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, and the Competition Act, 2002 (each of these is discussed in detail in Chapter III of the Working Paper). But none of these regulatory instruments have truly yielded results particularly, in terms of improving platform to business user (‘P2B’) relationships and contestability of the e-commerce market in India.

This Working Paper endeavours to contribute to the legal discourse on regulation of P2B relationships and restoring contestability in e-commerce markets by providing a detailed assessment of existing as well as proposed P2B competition regulation in seven international jurisdictions which lead the way in global regulatory response. What emerges is an interesting consensus on the immediate need to develop complementary ex-ante regulatory tools to identify and selectively regulate platforms with gatekeeper status in their respective markets, without burdening smaller platforms with the same rigour of regulation.

The above trend must not be ignored by lawmakers because the counterfactual - allowing privately owned, democratic legitimacy lacking digital platforms to set the rules of Indian e-commerce, without identifying and mitigating the long-term risks and the economic harm they can cause - is a scenario which we cannot afford.

Moreover, done rightly, E-marketplaces promise tremendous potential for consumers as well as sellers. Therefore, regulatory efforts must focus on developing an ecosystem that can nurture sustainable E-marketplaces.

---


Table of Contents

I. Setting the context: Indian e-commerce and the competition problem ............................................. 7

II. Decoding P2B competition issues in E-marketplaces .................................................................... 10

   Unique features of multi-sided platforms ....................................................................................... 10

   Competition issues in the P2B equation ......................................................................................... 11

III. Regulatory landscape applicable to E-marketplaces in India ..................................................... 14

   The Competition Act, 2002 ........................................................................................................... 15

   The Foreign Direct Investment Policy ............................................................................................ 18

   The Draft National E-commerce Policy, 2019 ............................................................................. 20

   The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 .................................................................................................................. 21

   The Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020 ................................................................ 22

IV. International regulatory response to P2B competition issues arising in E-marketplaces .............. 25

   The EU ........................................................................................................................................ 25

   The UK ....................................................................................................................................... 31

   Germany ..................................................................................................................................... 35

   Australia ..................................................................................................................................... 39

   Japan .......................................................................................................................................... 40

   The US ........................................................................................................................................ 41

   China .......................................................................................................................................... 43

V. A case for strengthening ex-ante P2B competition regulation ..................................................... 45

VI. The way forward: Questionnaire for recommendations ................................................................. 47

   Assessment of the Indian e-commerce market ............................................................................. 47

   Strengthening existing regulatory tools and adopting new approaches to regulating e-commerce markets in India ........................................................................................................... 47
I. Setting the context: Indian e-commerce and the competition problem

E-commerce – broadly, buying and selling online- is at the forefront of the digital revolution in India. With the fastest growing e-commerce market in the world, India is pacing itself to become a global hub of e-commerce owing to a multitude of factors fuelling it, such as increased smartphone penetration and data access, seamless integration with digital payments, availability of cash on delivery and a large consumer base.\(^6\)

Notably, e-commerce has witnessed the emergence of online Marketplaces (‘E-marketplaces’),\(^8\) which have grown increasingly popular in the past decade. In fact, one definitive impact of the COVID 19 pandemic has been to accelerate transition from offline to online shopping for consumers via E-marketplaces. Reportedly, despite the retail market shrinking by 5%, the e-commerce retail segment has grown by 25% to reach a whopping USD 38 billion in FY 2020-21.\(^9\)

E-marketplaces assume centre stage in e-commerce as they provide the digital platform that serves as an infrastructure upon which ‘business users/sellers’\(^10\) operate upon in order to reach ‘consumers’.\(^11\) Their business models rely on connecting these distinct user groups on different sides of the platform, making the platform ‘multi-sided’. In India, E-marketplaces are predominantly found in consumer goods (mobiles, lifestyle, electrical & electronic appliances, and grocery), food delivery and hotel booking services markets. Popular E-marketplaces in India include Flipkart, Amazon, Swiggy, Zomato, BigBasket, Nykaa and MakeMyTrip.

---


\(^7\) CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 5.

\(^8\) In this Working Paper, the term ‘E-marketplace’ is used to refer to platforms that primarily offer intermediation services to business users and consumers. They allow business users to offer goods or services to Consumers with a view to facilitating transactions between the business users and the consumers, for a monetary price. Aggregator platforms such as Ola, Uber and Urban Company are outside the purview of this Working Paper.


\(^10\) In this Working Paper, the term ‘Business User’ is used to refer to a legal or natural person who, in their commercial or professional capacity uses an E-marketplace’s services to offer goods or services to Consumers.

\(^11\) In this Working Paper, the term Consumer is understood in accordance with the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
E-marketplaces offer a multiplicity of benefits to both business users and consumers. In addition to gaining access to a wider segment of consumers, business users can also purchase services from the E-marketplace such as warehousing facilities, consumer targeted promotion and advertisement and centralised payment processing. To consumers, such E-marketplaces offer products at massively discounted rates coupled with facilities such as door-step delivery and return services, which result in high consumer satisfaction. This is however not without problems.

The e-commerce market in India exhibits a clear pattern of concentration, where very few E-marketplace giants hold control over a large part of the market, which makes them indispensable for business users desirous of accessing their sizeable online consumer base. Lockdowns and social distancing norms imposed in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic have further nudged business users to become all the more reliant upon E-marketplaces to reach consumers. Consequently, dealing with E-marketplaces has become unavoidable for many business users and has arguably led to such giants strategically positioning themselves as 'gatekeepers' wherein they control the entry points to and subsequently the manner in which business users transact in the e-commerce market.

However, as the proverbial saying goes "power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely". In this vein, increasingly vociferous allegations of E-marketplaces indulging in unfair practices such as self-preferencing, deep discounting, anti-competitive leveraging and imposition of unfair and discriminatory usage terms upon their business users have come to the fore. Trade organizations and unions have on multiple occasions approached the Competition Commission of India ('the CCI') and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to alleviate their concerns. Despite these outrages, e-commerce competition regulation, particularly from the viewpoint of business users and their relationships with online platforms, leaves much to be desired.

Notably, pursuing a light touch approach in regulating P2B relationships and promoting contestability in the market for e-commerce may prove to be short-sighted even from a consumer welfare standard. Unfairness in P2B relations stands to ultimately impact consumers in the form of reduced options due to the shrinking pool of sellers and resultant lack of competition, as well as the risk of platforms flexing their newly acquired market power by increasing prices directly or indirectly (for example, in the form of invasive collection and use of consumer data). Reduced contestability in the market for e-commerce may, among other things, prevent emergence of new innovative companies which could offer cheaper or better goods and services to consumers.

In this backdrop, this Working Paper seeks to initiate a discussion on effective regulatory tools to address competition law concerns in P2B relationships. It provides an overview of the global response to competition issues in P2B relationships. The underlying aim is to leapfrog in the right direction by adapting emerging global best practice to P2B competition issues prevalent in the Indian e-commerce market. Having briefly outlined the significance of E-marketplaces in India and their attendant competition concerns in this chapter, the remainder of the Working Paper is structured as follows: In Chapter II, we discuss in detail the modus operandi of platforms  

---

and the competition law challenges they pose especially to business users reliant on them. In Chapter III of this Working Paper, we provide an overview of the statutory instruments applicable to P2B relationships in India. The objective of this chapter is to highlight the extant gap in regulation of competition issues arising in P2B relationships. In Chapter IV, we present the ex-ante competition law framework adopted by or proposed to be adopted by seven global jurisdictions with a view to improve regulation of P2B dynamics. This chapter divulges an international trend to adopt ex-ante competition law tools to ensure that E-marketplaces remain fair and contestable. In Chapter V, we make a case for strengthening ex-ante tools to effectively regulate P2B competition issues in India. Finally in Chapter VI, with a view to facilitate effective stakeholder discussion, we provide suggestions for as well as raise questions on the nature and design of regulatory responses required in the Indian context.
II. Decoding P2B competition issues in E-marketplaces

It is well studied that the competition dynamics at play in E-marketplaces are notably different from traditional brick-and-mortar retail competition.16 This chapter illustrates the characteristic features of multi-sided platforms as applicable to E-marketplaces, and the impact of these features on competition. Lastly, this chapter encapsulates the key competition issues prevalent in P2B relationships in the Indian e-commerce market.

Unique features of multi-sided platforms

Data as an economic resource

The business model of digital platforms such as E-marketplaces is based on users' personal data, and flow of this data from one side to another.17 Such platforms collect, store, and use large amounts of data, derived from consumers that transact upon them.18 This accumulated consumer data is a veritable goldmine for E-marketplaces. They can use these large data samples to study consumption trends and monetize this knowledge in various ways including to compete against their business users by internally developing products and services for which there is demonstrated consumer appetite.19 For instance, the E-marketplace giant Amazon’s entry into retail through Amazon Basics20 and Flipkart’s entry into the furniture segment through Perfect Homes are examples of the consequential vertical integration due to data. By one of their own admissions, being in the e-commerce business, they possess consumer data “in reams and reams. Sifting through that data…” enables them to tailor their products to consumer preferences.21 There is fear that once such platforms enter adjacent markets, aggregated data at their disposal will result in foreclosure of new entrants who then cannot compete as efficiently without access to this critical input.22

Additionally, singular access to aggregated data can present a form of competitive advantage.23 A data-rich incumbent is able to further bolster its market position through an effect known as the ‘feedback loop’. Feedback loops manifest in two ways: A ‘user feedback loop’ where an entity with a large user base is able to collect more data to improve the quality of its service and thereby acquire new users, and a ‘monetization feedback loop’ where platforms are able to cash in on the aggregated user data to improve targeted advertisement, which in turn brings in more revenue to invest in the quality of the platform service thereby attracting more users.24 Such feedback loops reinforce the strength of an incumbent giant in the market, and therefore constitute a formidable barrier to entry for emerging E-marketplaces to effectively compete with incumbent giants.

Network effects

20 Reportedly, in May 2022, Amazon will end its joint venture with the company that controls Cloudtail, one of the biggest sellers on Amazon India. ‘Amazon, Top Indian Seller Cloudtail End Deal Amid Anti-Trust Probe’ NDTV Profit (9 August 2021) <https://www.ndtv.com/business/amazon-to-end-joint-venture-with-narayana-murthys-catamaran-2506532> accessed 1 July 2021.
‘Network effects’ refer to increased utility that a user derives from a service, when the number of other users consuming the service increases.\textsuperscript{25} For instance, the utility of a marketplace, increases for a consumer with the number of sellers on the marketplace and vice versa. Therefore, a competitive lead in such markets is self-reinforcing. This creates an effect where not only the product, but also the network of its users bears utility to the user. The greater the popularity of a digital platform, the harder it becomes to create an equally or more attractive competitor. This grants an incumbent an enormous beginner’s move advantage.\textsuperscript{26} Consequently, for a new entrant seeking to compete with an incumbent, not only does the entrant have to offer a better-quality product, but also convince users to migrate to the new platform by breaking the ‘lock-in effect’ created by the incumbent. This self-reinforcing mechanism also presents itself as a competitive advantage to incumbent giants.

\textbf{Economies of scale}

Economies of scale refers to a situation where the \textit{per-capita} cost of production of a good or service decreases with the increase in the number of goods or services produced. While this generally holds true for all markets, the way this phenomenon plays out is far more extreme in case of digital platforms.\textsuperscript{27} The increment in the cost of production of service to a new consumer acquired is almost negligible in case of a platform. For instance, every consumer that gets on a platform pays a price for the same, without the platform incurring almost any additional cost towards the provision of good or service to the consumer. This peculiarity also results in pre-existing dominant players having a huge competitive advantage over new entrants in terms of the price at which the service of the platform is offered. Additionally, in order to grow in size with the ultimate goal of reaping benefits of economies of scale, large platforms (which may not necessarily be dominant in a given market), defer their profits indefinitely by running at losses.

These features have arguably led to a diverse range of problems as we shall see below, peculiar to digital platform markets including E-marketplaces.\textsuperscript{28} These problems have challenged modern competition law which presupposes that the goal of any private entity is maximizing profits. The business model of platforms, however, prioritizes the expansion of their user-base as opposed to profit maximization.\textsuperscript{29} This significantly alters conventionally assumed incentives that platforms such as E-marketplaces have in the medium to short term. Therefore, analysing their behaviour and resultant competition issues requires a departure from the extant frame of reference.

\textbf{Competition issues in the P2B equation}

As stated earlier, the focus of this Working Paper is on analysing competition issues in e-commerce markets from a business user’s standpoint. Earlier in the day, e-commerce regulation in India was subject to a light touch approach as it was considered a nascent sector which required regulatory leeway to thrive. When the need for regulation was felt it was mostly from the lens of consumer protection as consumers ostensibly appeared to be the most affected stakeholders. It is only very recently that serious consideration has been given to statutory protection of the rights of business users of e-commerce platforms. Towards this end, the CCI, published a market study in January 2020 which looked into three major e-commerce markets namely accommodation, food and consumer goods.\textsuperscript{30} We discuss below the most significant competition concerns in the context of P2B relationships including those highlighted in CCI’s market study:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Lack of platform neutrality}: Often E-marketplaces use their platform to sell their own goods or services to consumers, directly or indirectly. This practice unarguably provides the E-marketplace an economic incentive and the ability to use its control over the platform to provide technical or economic advantages to its own offering which it could deny to competing business users.\textsuperscript{31} For example, CCI’s market study
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{30} CCI E-commerce Market Study.
notes that access to competitively sensitive data such as price and quantities sold for each product, seller and geography enables a platform to use such data to introduce its own competing private label and promote sales of such privately owned labels or those of its preferred sellers. Similarly, control over algorithms that determine ranking of products and services on the platform, allows the platform to manipulate rankings to the advantage of its own labels or those of its preferred sellers. In this regard, the CCI’s market study concludes that several business users report a lack of neutrality by E-marketplaces towards them. Business users have alleged that preferential treatment is granted by platforms to their own/affiliated products or to some preferred sellers, and such discrimination acts as a barrier to market access for business users operating on such a platform.

- **Lack of transparency in search rankings and user review policy**: Often E-marketplaces are vertically integrated and directly or indirectly sell their own private labels to consumers, creating a conflict of interest. They may also charge a commission from business users ostensibly for legitimate purposes but with an underlying promise to give preference to business users who pay the commission. Given its control on important parameters of the digital infrastructure such as search rankings and user reviews, the E-marketplace has the ability to undermine the contestability for products or services offered internally (or by commission paying business users) to the detriment of third party business users, for example by giving prominence to its own products in search rankings. The CCI market study notes that the lack of transparency in the mechanism governing such search rankings and user reviews has reportedly impeded with the ability of business users to compete effectively with the platform's preferred sellers or other vertically integrated units.

- **Unfair contract terms**: The CCI market study reports alleged imposition of unfair terms such as arbitrary discounting policies and tying/bundling of products by platforms, as business users do not possess the bargaining power to negotiate. Additionally, business users have also reported that platforms unilaterally revise contract terms for their own benefit and relegate the appearance of certain businesses in search results in lieu of lower commission rates paid by such businesses to the platform.

- **Lack of transparency regarding the usage of aggregated consumer data**: As discussed earlier, the ability to access and use data plays a central role in value creation in the online platform economy. An E-marketplace that also directly or indirectly acts as an online retailer on its own platform can take advantage of its dual role to use data, generated from transactions by its business users using its platform, for the purpose of developing its own products or services which are similar to those offered by its business users. For example, the CCI's market study highlights that business users in India have alleged that platforms withhold critical information regarding consumer preference, while selectively using such data to enhance their own products.

- **Deep discounting**: The CCI market study notes that several large platforms engage in price distortion by providing additional discounts on the price set by the sellers of a product or service to widen their customer base. As such, business users effectively lose their control over the final price of a product. Since customers prefer to avail the same service at a cheaper price, such deep discounting has also restricted business users from making the product available through other offline channels at a price higher than the discounted price set by digital platforms.

- **Platform Parity Clauses**: These are also referred to as MFN/Most-favoured-nation clauses. Using MFN clauses, platforms restrict the ability of business users to offer goods or services to consumers under more favourable conditions through other means than through their platform. The CCI market study

---

32 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 21
33 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 20
34 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 20
36 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 21
37 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 24
38 CCI E-commerce Market Study, pages 22-23
39 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 23
40 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 23
41 DMA, para 43.
42 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 25
43 CCI E-commerce Market Study, pages 26-27
44 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 27
45 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 27
46 EU P2B Regulations.
notes the alleged prevalence of restrictions imposed by E-marketplaces upon business users from charging a lower price on other platforms or even on their own websites.\textsuperscript{47} Such terms of contract restrict independent economic growth of business users outside the ecosystem of the E-marketplace. They also harm the consumer by fixing a floor price as well as limiting inter-platform contestability, which in turn limits the choice of alternative digital and physical channels, for consumers.\textsuperscript{48}

- **Exclusive agreements**: Business users surveyed by the CCI have also raised concerns in regard to exclusive agreements wherein a particular product, through an agreement, is to be launched exclusively on one platform.\textsuperscript{49} In some cases, products of a business user get delisted as a consequence of agreements which make a platform list only one brand in a certain product category.\textsuperscript{50} The study notes that such exclusive agreements may result in anti-competitive foreclosure.

The competition concerns discussed above may be attributed to a variety of factors including the role of E-marketplaces as both an infrastructure facility provider to and a competitor with business users. The dual role assumed by E-marketplaces has serious bearings on inter alia, the perceived neutrality of the E-marketplace, the lack of transparency in search rankings, user review policy and storage and use of data. Moreover, the fact that presence of business users on leading E-marketplaces has become vital for business users' survival is exploited by E-marketplaces to unilaterally impose terms of contract that are disadvantageous for its business users.

In the next chapter, we aim to discuss in detail the statutory instruments applicable to such P2B relationships in India with a view to demonstrate a gap in regulatory tools available to address the aforementioned issues.

\textsuperscript{47} CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 25
\textsuperscript{48} DMA, para 37.
\textsuperscript{49} CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 26
\textsuperscript{50} CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 26
III. Regulatory landscape applicable to E-marketplaces in India

The regulation of e-commerce, and resultantly of competition issues concerning E-marketplaces, is largely amorphous and fragmented despite its increasing relevance to the Indian economy. Arguably such a fragmented approach involving a multitude of regulators and their laws is inevitable considering that ‘e-commerce’ refers to a business model i.e., the buying and selling of good and services electronically, and not a sector per se. While some laws apply uniformly to all e-commerce businesses the exact scope of regulatory scrutiny depends upon a variety of factors including the nature of the goods and services transacted and the jurisdiction of operation of the given e-commerce entity.

In the specific context of the regulatory landscape governing P2B competition issues in E-marketplaces, the Competition Act, 2002, the consolidated Foreign Direct Investment Policy, the Draft E-commerce Policy 2019, the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 and the Consumer Protection (E-commerce) Rules, 2020 are noteworthy.

---

51 Section 2(44), the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; The Draft E-commerce Policy also embodies a similar definition: “e-Commerce includes buying, selling, marketing or distribution of (i) goods, including digital products and (ii) services; through electronic network. Delivery of goods, including digital products, and services may be online or through traditional mode of physical delivery. Similarly, payments against such goods and services may be made online or through traditional banking channels i.e. cheques, demand drafts or through cash.” The Draft E-commerce Policy also contains an annexure of that tables the definition of E-commerce as has been defined in various Indian statutes: Draft National E-commerce Policy: India’s Data for India’s Development, 2019, (Draft E-commerce Policy) pages 38-41 <https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/DraftNational_e-commerce_Policy_23February2019.pdf> accessed 1 July 2021.

52 The statutory instruments applicable to E-commerce include the Information and Technology Act, 2000; Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007; Legal Metrology Act, 2009 read with Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodity) Rules, 2011; Sale of Goods Act, 1930; Competition Act, 2002 (the Competition Act); Consumer Protection Act, 2019; the Draft E-commerce Policy; the Foreign Direct Investment Policy under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999; the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the applicable rules and regulations farm thereunder. Additionally, intellectual property rights laws such as the Patents Act, 1970; the Copyright Act, 1957; and the Trademark Act, 1999 are also applicable.

53 Other business/sector specific statutory instruments include the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1998 Additionally, several state-specific laws are applicable such as the Karnataka On-demand Transportation Technology Aggregators Rules, 2016 and the Maharashtra City Taxi Rules 2017 are applicable to cab aggregators in the respective states.
The aforementioned statutory instruments collectively regulate several aspects pertaining to the P2B equation in E-marketplaces. While the Competition Act, 2002, primarily follows an *ex-post* model of regulation, i.e., regulation that is applied *retrospectively* once the conduct has already occurred, the other instruments apply *ex-ante*, i.e., they apply *prospectively* to regulate future conduct of E-marketplaces.

The following section contains a brief overview of these laws and policies as applicable to E-marketplaces, and their relevance in regulating P2B relationships.

**The Competition Act, 2002**

Competition on and amongst E-marketplaces is regulated under the Competition Act, 2002 (*Competition Act*), whose enforcement is entrusted with the CCI. As discussed previously, the Competition Act follows an *ex-post* model of regulating anti-competitive conduct wherein the CCI intervenes when contraventions in section 3 or section 4 occur. While section 3 sets out a prohibition on anti-competitive agreements, section 4 deals with the regulation of unilateral anti-competitive conduct by dominant entities.

Combinations are however regulated *ex-ante*, wherein parties intending to enter into a combination are required to notify and seek approval from the CCI prior to consummation of the transaction if the thresholds in section 5 of the Competition Act are triggered.

Anti-competitive practices pertaining to e-commerce thus far have been subject to the CCI’s scrutiny both under sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act. As previously elaborated, prevalent anti-competitive conduct on E-marketplaces may take the shape of various anti-competitive practices such as biased search rankings, reviews and rating mechanisms, obscure policies on collection and usage of aggregated data, unilateral revision of P2B contact terms, exclusive agreements with certain preferred sellers or private labels, and imposition of unfair price parity clauses and discount policies.

In regulating the aforementioned anti-competitive practices, section 3 may only potentially cover limited types of practices that involve two or more parties to an agreement, such as exclusive agreements, imposition of parity clauses through agreements and other contractual obligations which may have an anti-competitive effect. Moreover, presently while determining whether an agreement has an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) under section 3, the CCI is required to consider a limited set of factors laid out in section 19(3) of the Competition Act. These factors were formulated over two decades ago and may not always account for considerations that are unique to the platform economy. To address this issue, the Competition Law Review Committee (‘CLRC’) constituted by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, in its 2019 Report has recommended widening section 19(3) to make it an inclusive provision with a view to allowing newer considerations which may be relevant for digital markets to be factored in while assessing AAEC of an agreement. However, recommendations of the CLRC are yet to be codified.

Section 4 deals with the regulation of unilateral anti-competitive conduct by prohibiting dominant entities from abusing their position. Resultantly, unfair practices related to search results, rankings, ratings, collection and

---

54 Section 19(1), the Competition Act
55 Section 3, the Competition Act
56 Section 4, the Competition Act
57 Sections 5 and 6, the Competition Act
58 Section 5 and 6 of the Competition Act
61 CCI E-commerce Market Study
62 It must also be noted that the Competition Law Review Committee (CLRC) has highlighted the need to understand “agreements” under section 3 in an expansive manner, particularly in digital markets: Ministry of Corporate Affairs, ‘Report Of Competition Law Review Committee (CLRC Report)’ (2019) <https://ies.gov.in/pdfs/Report-Competition-CLRC.pdf> accessed 1 July 2021. Accordingly, the Competition Bill, 2020 has sought to amend section 3(4) of the Act to cover agreements that are neither strictly horizontal nor vertical, in order to broaden the scope for intervention by the CCI. The Bill may be accessed at: The Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2020 <https://www.taxmanagementindia.com/file_folder/folder_5/Draft_Competition_Amendment_Bill_2020.pdf> accessed 1 July 2021.
63 Vidhi provided research and drafting assistance to the CLRC in preparation of the CLRC Report.
64 CLRC Report, page 68.
65 Section 2, the Competition Act.
usage of aggregated data, unilateral revision of contract terms and discount policies may potentially be regulated under section 4 of the Competition Act if the E-marketplace in question is dominant. Therefore, establishing ‘dominance’ is a pre-condition for assessing whether a certain practice is abusive under section 4 of the Competition Act.

‘Dominance’ is defined as a position of market strength enjoyed by an enterprise in its relevant market that allows it to operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in its relevant market or affect its competitors or consumers or its relevant market in its favour. Therefore, while assessing dominance, the first step for the CCI is to delineate the ‘relevant market’ within which the strength of the entity is examined. Following this, the CCI assesses whether the entity enjoys dominance in the defined ‘relevant market’ by accounting for factors enumerated in section 19(4) of the Competition Act. This exercise is carried out for each case individually as there is no statutory bright line test for dominance under the Competition Act. Such an assessment of dominance for E-marketplaces has arguably given rise to two key issues:

The delineation of relevant market

The delineation of relevant market is an evidence-based exercise wherein the CCI scopes the strength of an E-marketplace by assessing the availability of substitutes to the E-marketplace's services in a given geographical area. The purpose of such an assessment is to evaluate the entity's market strength relative to its competitors operating in the same relevant market. Therefore, it often follows that in a narrowly defined relevant market the market strength of an entity is more readily apparent, while in a widely defined relevant market, the market strength tends to appear diluted. Consequently, the wider the relevant market, the tougher the assessment of the entity’s dominance becomes. In this context, it is of note that the CCI’s approach to the delineation of relevant market has evolved through the years. In 2014, in the early days of the advent of e-commerce in India, the CCI in its order Ashish Ahuja v. Snapdeal and Others considered online and offline markets as separate channels of distribution of the same ‘relevant market’. However, in its more recent cases such as All India Vendors Association v. Flipkart and Lifestyle Equities C.V. and another v. Amazon Seller Services Private Ltd. And Others, the CCI has considered delineating E-marketplaces as a separate ‘relevant market’ entirely, owing to the distinctive features at play.

Further, E-marketplaces are ‘multi-sided’ and provide distinct yet interrelated services to both consumers and business users. As such, the assessment of what constitutes a ‘relevant market’ for the purposes of an E-marketplace that is operational on multiple sides of the platform in a given transaction, is arguably a complex exercise. Resultantly, it has been argued that many tools that are traditionally used in the assessment of relevant market may not adequately capture features such as the impact of direct and indirect network effects on prices, the presence of interconnected but distinct markets on different sides of the platform, and the implicit price of data paid by a consumer. Notably, as a step in the right direction, the CLRC Report recommended widening the scope of delineation of relevant markets under sections 19(6) and 19(7) of the

---

66 Explanation (a) to section 4, the Competition Act.
67 Section 19(5), the Competition Act.
68 Section 19(4), the Competition Act.
69 Mr. Ramakant Kini v. Dr. L.H. Hiranandani Hospital, Powai, Mumbai 2014 SCC OnLine CCI 17
70 Sections 19(5), 2(1), 2(6), the Competition Act
72 all India Vendors Association v. Flipkart 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 97, para 27 - In this case the CCI did not conclusively determine that E-marketplaces constitute a separate relevant market since the question was redundant in the circumstances of the case. However, it noted the distinct features of platforms and recognized the possibility of delineating E-marketplaces as a separate “relevant market”.
Competition Act to accommodate for factors that may apply to new-age digital markets.\textsuperscript{79} Further, while the CLRC Report concluded that non-monetary considerations such as data may be captured in the definition of ‘price’ as per the Competition Act,\textsuperscript{80} a comprehensive legal assessment that captures such nuances of ‘E-marketplaces’ is yet to be examined by the CCI in practice.\textsuperscript{81}

**Assessing ‘dominance’ within the relevant market**

Upon the delineation of the relevant market, the CCI then proceeds to assess the dominance of an entity in accordance with the factors enumerated in section 19(4) of the Competition Act, which include *inter alia* market share, size and resources of the enterprise and barriers to entry for competitors.\textsuperscript{82}

As elaborated previously, characteristic features of platform markets, such as access to data, network-effects and economies of scale pivot the market in favour of an incumbent entity and present as novel barriers to new entrants. Notably, the CLRC Report acknowledges that access to data and network-effects are important considerations while determining dominance and has concluded that the inclusive nature of section 19(4) of the Competition Act enables the CCI to consider such factors while assessing dominance.\textsuperscript{83}

Further, given the extreme nature of economies of scope and scale in such markets, business models of platforms, prioritize growth over profits, i.e. expansion of their user-base as opposed to profit maximization.\textsuperscript{84} As such, they do not compete in the market, but compete for the market because such markets typically demonstrate a winner-takes-all effect.\textsuperscript{85}

Arguably, such markets are not designed to support multiple firms competing on quality or price, and therefore, a traditional assessment using statutory metrics such as market share does not serve as a useful proxy for dominance.\textsuperscript{86} Further, the conjoint effect of a beginner’s move advantage of an incumbent platform which is amplified by data-driven feedback loops and network effects,\textsuperscript{87} present exponentially laborious barriers of entry to competitors. To fully account for the magnitude of these novel factors within the contours of the present framework for dominance, the CCI will have to adopt a highly nuanced understanding of E-marketplaces and their growth strategy. Firstly, gatekeeper E-marketplaces may not always be dominant and secondly abuse of dominance provisions under the Competition Act may not capture malpractices by gatekeeper E-marketplaces if there is no demonstrable anti-competitive effect within clearly defined relevant markets. This may result in situations where a gatekeeper E-marketplace may behave abusively and influence markets in ways that dominant entities do, without triggering action under statutory abuse of dominance provisions.\textsuperscript{88}

The CCI’s dynamically evolving understanding of competition issues in regards to E-marketplace giants in its orders in cases such as *Ashish Ahuja v. SnapDeal and Others*,\textsuperscript{89} *Mohit Manglani v. M/s Flipkart India Private Limited & Ors*,\textsuperscript{90} *All India Online Vendors Association v. Flipkart India Private Limited & Ors*,\textsuperscript{91} *Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh v. Flipkart and Ors*,\textsuperscript{92} and *Lifestyle Equities C.V. and another v. Amazon Seller Services Private Ltd. and Ors*\textsuperscript{92} and its

\textsuperscript{79} CLRC Report, pages 70-72.
\textsuperscript{80} CLRC Report, page 152
\textsuperscript{81} While a legal assessment in the specific context of E-marketplaces is yet to be undertaken, in the recent CCI *suo motu* order in In Re: *Updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy for WhatsApp Users* 2021 SCC OnLine CCI 19, para 32, the CCI has clearly spelt out that non-price-based parameters such as control of consumers’ personal data, are equally, if not more important than price in today’s new-age markets. Therefore, even though it is evident that the CCI’s jurisprudence on ‘price’ is evolving, a concrete example as to the inclusion of non-price-based parameters in the delineation of relevant markets in the specific context of E-marketplaces is yet to be seen
\textsuperscript{82} Section 19(4), the Competition Act.
\textsuperscript{83} While the CLRC Report acknowledged the importance of data and network-effects in assessment of dominance, it did not specifically recommend an amendment to section 19(4) to add these factors for the following reasons – 1) clause (b) of section 19(4) refers to ‘resources of the enterprise’ which may include data 2) section 19(4) is inclusive and therefore CCI may rely on factors such as ‘network-effects’ which are not mentioned in section 19(4) while inquiring whether an enterprise enjoys a dominant position or not under section 4 - CLRC Report, pages 156-158.
\textsuperscript{87} CLRC Report, pages 156-157
\textsuperscript{88} Ashish Ahuja v. SnapDeal and Others 2014 SCC OnLine CCI 67
\textsuperscript{89} Mohit Manglani v. M/s Flipkart India Private Limited & Ors 2015 SCC OnLine CCI 66
\textsuperscript{90} All India Online Vendors Association v. Flipkart India Private Limited & Ors 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 97
\textsuperscript{91} Delhi Vyapar Mahasangh v. Flipkart and Ors 2020 SCC OnLine CCI 3.
\textsuperscript{92} Lifestyle Equities C.V. and another v. Amazon Seller Services Private Ltd. and Ors 2020 SCC OnLine CCI 33
market study on e-commerce in India, reflects that regulating gatekeeper platforms is an extremely complex task. For example, in the Ashish Ahuja case of 2014 where the issue of deep-discounting of goods on E-marketplaces was in question, the CCI observed that the e-commerce industry “thrives on special discounts and deals” (emphasis supplied). However, in its 2020 market study, the CCI exhibited a more nuanced approach when it observed that it is “not clear that these discounts are efficiency based competition on the merits” while also raising concerns regarding the impact of deep discounts on diminishing competitive efficacy of sellers.

Given the complexity in platform regulation confounding regulators across the globe, even in India despite several allegations of anti-competitive practices being levelled against E-marketplaces, effective regulatory intervention has been elusive. As a step in the right direction, the CCI by its market study on e-commerce has nudged E-marketplaces to adopt best practices such as platform neutrality, clear pricing policies and non-discriminatory P2B contract terms in order to promote contestability of services offered by E-marketplaces as well as information symmetry and transparency for both business users and consumers. The CCI’s observations in its market study largely mirror the European Union’s Regulation on Promoting Fairness and Transparency for Business Users of Online Intermediation Services (‘EU P2B Regulations’). However, given that the CCI’s observations are in the nature of policy prescriptions, their scope for enforceability under the Competition Act remains dubious.

Similarly, even though the CLRC in its 2019 Report acknowledged that critical combinations in digital markets may be escaping scrutiny of the CCI owing to the present combination notification thresholds based on ‘turnover’ and ‘assets’ of the parties involved and recommended introduction of additional notification thresholds, its recommendations are far from acquiring the force of law.

The Foreign Direct Investment Policy

India’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy which is notified by the Department of Promotion for Industry and Internal Trade (‘DPIIT’), Ministry of Commerce and Industry serves as an important source of obligations for foreign-funded E-marketplaces in India. The significant attributes of the FDI policy for E-marketplaces include the following:

- **Structural intervention** - The policy permits FDI backed e-commerce entities to only operate as a ‘marketplace’ i.e., where it facilitates buying and selling of goods and services between sellers/business users and consumers on its platform. The policy expressly prohibits FDI backed e-commerce entities

---

93 CCI E-commerce Market Study
95 CCI E-commerce Market Study, para 108
98 CCI E-commerce Market Study
99 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 29
100 CCI E-commerce Market Study, page 33
101 CCI E-commerce Market study, pages 30-31
102 CCI E-commerce Market Study page 35
105 In India, the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (‘DPIIT’), which falls under the Ministry of Commerce & Industry, makes policy pronouncements on India’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through the Consolidated FDI Policy Circular, Press Notes and Press Releases which are notified by the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, as amendments to the Foreign Exchange Management (Non-Debt Instruments) Rules, 2019 under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999)(FEMA). The extant policy allows 100% foreign investment under the automatic route for e-commerce entities using the ‘Marketplace Model’. No foreign investment is permitted in the inventory-based model of e-commerce: The Consolidated FDI Policy, 2020 (The Consolidated FDI Policy) <https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI-PolicyCircular-2020-29October2020_0.pdf> accessed 1 July 2021.
106 The Consolidated FDI Policy, page 49.
from operating as an inventory-based model,\textsuperscript{107} wherein the E-marketplace has ownership or control\textsuperscript{108} over the goods and services which it directly sells to consumers. The policy states that for FDI backed E-marketplaces, inventory of a vendor will be deemed to be controlled by the E-marketplace if more than 25% of purchases of a vendor are from the E-marketplace entity or its group companies.\textsuperscript{109} In fact, the FDI policy goes as far as prohibiting any “entity having equity participation by e-commerce marketplace entity or its group companies, or having control on its inventory by e-commerce marketplace entity or its group companies” … from “selling its products on the platform run by such marketplace entity.” (emphasis supplied).\textsuperscript{110} The intent of the policy is unequivocally to prevent E-marketplaces from acting in a dual capacity as a seller on the platform and as well as the platform provider, thereby minimizing the plausibility of self-preferencing. Interestingly the policy prohibits E-marketplaces with FDI from undertaking Multi-Brand Retail.\textsuperscript{111}

- **Maintenance of neutrality of platforms** - The policy permits E-marketplaces to provide support services to their business users including warehousing, logistics, order fulfillment and payment collection.\textsuperscript{112} However, it mandates that e-commerce platforms provide such services to their business users on an arms-length basis, and in a fair and non-discriminatory manner.\textsuperscript{113} The FDI policy in effect requires E-marketplace platforms to be neutral in their dealings with their business users.

- **Prohibiting deep discounting, preferential treatment of certain business users and exclusive agreements** - The FDI policy also places an obligation upon E-marketplaces to maintain a level playing field, specifically by refraining from directly or indirectly influencing the sale price of goods or services sold on its platform.\textsuperscript{114} It further mandates parity between contracts and offers such as cash backs to be made available to all sellers indiscriminately.\textsuperscript{115} Additionally, the policy also prohibits e-commerce marketplace entities from mandating any business user to sell any product exclusively on its platform.\textsuperscript{116} The FDI policy therefore aims to curb practices of exclusive agreements, preferential treatment extended to certain sellers and private labels and deep discounting.

It is evident that the extant FDI policy attempts to promote contestability in services offered by E-marketplaces and fairness in P2B relationships by targeting a number of anti-competitive practices such as self-preferencing, lack of platform neutrality, deep discounting, exclusive agreements and preferential treatment to selected sellers. However, the usage of the FDI policy as an ex-ante competition enforcement tool for E-marketplaces bears serious limitations as discussed below:

- First, as the FDI policy applies only to foreign-funded e-commerce entities, domestically funded e-commerce entities will potentially escape the obligations under the FDI policy, leading to a lacuna in ex-ante regulation of P2B relationships for such platforms.\textsuperscript{117} Further, this may also create a discriminatory environment in favour of domestic players, thereby holding the potential to distort competition, and risk harming consumer welfare in the long run.\textsuperscript{118}

- Second, the fact that obligations under the FDI policy are formulated and notified by the DPPIIT but enforced by the Enforcement Directorate has reportedly led to confusion and dissatisfaction amongst several trader organizations regarding its enforcement efficacy.\textsuperscript{119} Additionally, many market players

\textsuperscript{107} The Consolidated FDI Policy, pages 49-50.
\textsuperscript{108} The policy presumes that inventory of a business user is controlled by an E-marketplace if more than 25% of a business user’s sales are from the E-marketplace entity or its group companies. - The Consolidated FDI Policy, 2020, para (iv), page 50.
\textsuperscript{109} The Consolidated FDI Policy, page 50.
\textsuperscript{110} The Consolidated FDI Policy, page 50.
\textsuperscript{111} The Consolidated FDI Policy, para (ix), page 55.
\textsuperscript{112} The Consolidated FDI Policy, para (ili), page 50.
\textsuperscript{113} The Consolidated FDI Policy, para (ix), page 50-51.
\textsuperscript{114} The Consolidated FDI Policy, para (ix), page 50-51.
\textsuperscript{115} The Consolidated FDI Policy, para (ix), page 50-51.
\textsuperscript{116} The Consolidated FDI Policy, para (ix), pages 50-51.
have also alleged that uncertainty around the FDI policy given its frequent revisions that require expensive internal restructuring, reduce the ease of doing business.\(^{120}\)

- Finally, it is important to note that the FDI policy does not engage with the relevance of competitively sensitive data aggregated by E-marketplaces - its collection, storage, usage and right of business users to access such data. The debate surrounding the use and abuse of competitively sensitive data has been at the forefront of antitrust enforcement in other jurisdictions.\(^{121}\) At present, India does not have any enforceable statutory instruments that governs collection and usage of competitively sensitive data.\(^{122}\)

In light of the above, it is apparent that the FDI policy may not be sufficient to promote fair play in P2B relationships or improve contestability of services offered by incumbent E-marketplaces.

### The Draft National E-commerce Policy, 2019

In order to streamline e-commerce regulation in India, the DPIIT has attempted to put in place a centralized policy framework for e-commerce, and accordingly has proposed a Draft National E-commerce Policy (\textit{Draft E-commerce Policy}) in 2019. The stated aim of the policy is to create a regulatory environment that promotes competition, entrepreneurship and innovation in Indian e-commerce.\(^{123}\) It takes note of issues such as consumer protection, privacy and anti-competitive behaviour which require redressal while maintaining the growth momentum of the e-commerce industry.\(^{124}\)

The avenues that the Draft E-commerce Policy puts forth in the specific context of regulating P2B relationships are limited. While the policy elaborately discusses the relevance of E-marketplaces and makes suggestions to place certain obligations upon them,\(^{125}\) they are largely consumer welfare centric, aimed at tackling issues such as counterfeiting,\(^{126}\) piracy,\(^{127}\) and improving consumer related services.\(^{128}\) The policy also suggests that E-marketplaces must only publish those reviews and ratings that are authentic and verified in a transparent and non-discriminate manner, which may purportedly satisfy the twin goal of ensuring platform neutrality and transparency for consumers.\(^{129}\) Barring this, the policy merely comments on the role of the FDI policy in promoting fairness and non-discrimination for business users of platforms and does not directly contribute towards improving P2B regulation.

Further, the Draft E-commerce Policy also entails a detailed discussion on the role and strategic importance of aggregated consumer data for e-commerce businesses.\(^{130}\) However, it does not make any actionable suggestions that are aimed at data sharing between E-marketplaces and business users.

While the policy awaits finalization, numerous experts and media houses who claim to have reviewed an unofficial draft of the updated policy as recently as March 2021, have reported a complete overhaul of the Draft


121 Chapter IV of this Working Paper surveys the regulatory response of seven jurisdictions in relation to the competition regulation of ‘data’ in the context of P2B regulation.

122 The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 is currently pending before the Parliament of India. The Draft E-commerce Policy, which contained several provisions on the use of competitively sensitive data is reportedly undergoing several changes. Additionally, the Report by the Committee of Experts on Non-Personal Data Governance Framework recommends the setting of a separate Non-Personal Data Authority.


124 Draft E-commerce Policy, page 10.

125 Draft E-commerce Policy, pages 19-23.


127 Draft E-commerce Policy, page 22.

128 Draft E-commerce Policy, page 23.

129 Draft E-commerce Policy, page 23.

130 Draft E-commerce Policy, pages 11-17.
E-commerce Policy.\textsuperscript{131} Reportedly, the updated Draft E-commerce Policy seeks to formulate a code for fair play,\textsuperscript{132} that \textit{inter alia} promotes transparency between e-commerce giants and its business users, particularly with regard to discount offerings and participation by vendors in various schemes.\textsuperscript{133} The particulars of the updated policy and the proposed manner of its enforcement remain to be seen.

### The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021

Amidst growing concerns of lack of transparency and accountability towards users of digital media including digital social media, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (\textquote{MeitY}) notified the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (\textit{IT Intermediary Rules})\textsuperscript{134} in February 2021.\textsuperscript{135} The IT Intermediary Rules are jointly administered by MeitY and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.\textsuperscript{136}

While the Information Technology Act, 2000, defines 'intermediaries' to include 'online-market places'\textsuperscript{137}, a perusal of the nature of obligations imposed under the IT Intermediary Rules reveals that the rules are targeted at regulating social media intermediaries, significant social media intermediaries, news publishers and aggregators and publishers of online curated content.

Further, the obligations placed upon the above categories of intermediaries under the scheme of the IT Intermediary Rules are aimed at protecting privacy and promoting transparency and overall safety in information dissemination on the internet. The obligations include mandatory display of privacy policy\textsuperscript{138} and other terms of use,\textsuperscript{139} duty to remove certain information such as fake news and obscene content,\textsuperscript{140} setting up of a grievance redressal mechanism\textsuperscript{141}, and duty to enable identification of first originator information.\textsuperscript{142} Further, the rules contain a detailed 'Code of Ethics' and a three-tiered grievance redressal mechanism for regulating content on

---


\textsuperscript{137} Section 2(w) of the IT Act, 2000 - "intermediary, with respect to any particular electronic records, means any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits that record or provides any service with respect to that record and includes telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online-market places and cyber cafes;" [emphasis supplied].

\textsuperscript{138} Rule 3(1)(a) of IT Intermediary Rules.

\textsuperscript{139} Rule 3(1) (a) of IT Intermediary Rules.

\textsuperscript{140} Rule 3(1)(b) of IT Intermediary Rules.

\textsuperscript{141} Rule 3(2) of IT Intermediary Rules.

\textsuperscript{142} Rule 4(2) of IT Intermediary Rules - It is of note that the obligation stipulated in rule 4(2) is applicable only to "significant social media intermediary providing services primarily in the nature of messaging".

---

21
digital media. With respect to obligations of E-marketplace platforms, it may be argued that at best the IT Intermediary Rules cover issues such as disclosure of terms of use including privacy policy of the E-marketplace, preventing the sale of counterfeit products by sellers on E-marketplaces and setting up of grievance redressal mechanisms by E-marketplaces.

Therefore, it is evident that the intended scope of the IT Intermediary Rules does not extend to regulation of P2B competition issues arising in E-marketplaces. These rules were a culmination of growing litigation around the use and misuse digital media including digital social media and a need to effectively regulate the role of intermediaries in such information dissemination. As such, its relevance in regulating E-marketplaces and competition issues in their P2B relationships is limited.

### The Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020

In July 2020, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution notified the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020 ('E-commerce Rules') under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The E-commerce Rules are applicable to all goods and services bought or sold over digital or electronic networks, across all models of e-commerce and electronic retail.

In accordance with its stated purpose of ensuring consumer welfare, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines ‘consumer’ to only include those persons who buy, hire or avail goods or services for personal consumption, and categorically excludes those who buy, hire or avail goods or services for “commercial purposes”. Resultantly, business users that avail the services of e-commerce platforms in the course of their trade are outside the Act’s purview. While the E-commerce Rules employ the same definition of ‘consumer’ as the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the rules also contains a definition of ‘user’ to mean “any person who accesses or avails any computer resource of an e-commerce entity”. which, while ambiguous, may potentially cover business users. However, the E-commerce Rules do not contain specific provisions for the protection of such ‘users’, but merely prescribe certain obligations that an e-commerce entity is expected to adhere to in order to provide adequate information and disclosures to all its ‘users’.

Further, it is evident that the obligations imposed by the E-commerce Rules have been formulated with an intent to prevent unfair practices and to promote transparency and information symmetry between e-commerce...
entities and consumers. These obligations include maintaining transparency in pricing, refunds and cancellation charges, and setting up an effective grievance redressal mechanism for consumers. In addition to the above, liabilities specific to E-marketplaces include the due diligence requirements prescribed under the Intermediary Rules, mandatory display of information about the seller, information relating to available methods of payment, returns and refunds, exchanges, warranties, delivery and shipment, and disclosures regarding the key search ranking parameters and their relative importance in determining ranking of sellers or their goods on the platform, and any different treatment harm. As is evident from the above, the E-commerce Rules are consumer welfare centric, primarily aimed at prescribing disclosure and due diligence obligations of e-commerce entities in order protect the rights and interest of consumers. As ‘business users’ do not fall under the purview of ‘consumer’, the applicability of E-Commerce Rules in the specific context regulating P2B relationships is limited.

In June 2021, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution published draft amendments to the E-commerce Rules (‘Draft Amendment E-commerce Rules’) that seek to additional accountability and transparency enabling obligations upon e-commerce entities. In the specific context of P2B relationships, the Draft Amendment E-commerce Rules seek to: place a ban on E-marketplaces from organising certain types of discount sales called ‘flash sales’ which only benefit private labels directly or indirectly controlled by the E-marketplace, prohibit companies providing logistic services for E-marketplaces from discriminating between sellers of the same category, prohibit E-marketplaces from using data aggregated on their platform to gain any unfair advantage, prohibit selling of goods and services using the brand name or any other association with the E-marketplace, prohibit profiling of consumers to promote private labels and prohibit any related or associated parties of the E-marketplace from listing themselves as a seller on its platform. While the Draft Amendment E-commerce Rules await finalization, it is of note that they have garnered considerable criticism for placing onerous and ambiguous obligations upon all e-commerce entities without distinction in their scale or size and for creating overlaps with the mandate of the CCI.

156 Rule 4(11)(a), E-commerce Rules.
159 Rule 4(4) E-commerce Rules.
160 Rule 5(1) E-commerce Rules.
161 Rule 5(3a) E-commerce Rules.
162 Rule 5(3c) E-commerce Rules.
163 Rule 5(3f) E-commerce Rules.
164 Rule 5(4) E-commerce Rules.
168 Draft Rules 6(6), Draft Amendment E-commerce Rules.
169 Rule 5(14), Draft Amendment E-commerce Rules.
170 Rule 5(14), Draft Amendment E-commerce Rules.
From our discussion above on the regulatory landscape governing E-marketplaces in India, it is clear that the P2B competition issues discussed in Chapter II, are primarily under the prerogative of ex-post regulation under the Competition Act. With the limited exception of the FDI policy which seeks to regulate a handful of P2B competition issues in foreign funded E-marketplaces, none of the ex-ante instruments discussed above comprehensively address P2B competition issues ex-ante. The blind spot in the Indian regulatory framework for E-marketplaces in regard to P2B competition regulation is therefore evident.
IV. International regulatory response to P2B competition issues arising in E-marketplaces

The regulatory vacuum as far as fairness in P2B relationships and contestability of services provided by E-marketplaces are concerned is not exclusive to India. The world has only very recently taken serious cognisance of this issue. And now most jurisdictions are racing against time to devise regulatory tools to address unfairness and reduced contestability of services provided by gatekeeper platforms. In this chapter, we take stock of regulatory measures adopted or proposed in the European Union (‘EU’), United Kingdom (‘UK’), Germany, Australia, Japan, the United States of America (‘US’) and China. These countries have in a certain sense emerged as torchbearers of regulatory response designed to foster growth of e-commerce markets in a fair and competitive manner. Our aim is to inform the legal discourse on the way forward for shaping effective regulatory response to the prevalent P2B competition issues and lack of overall competitiveness in services provided by E-marketplaces in India.

The EU

The EU has been at the forefront of regulating the digital economy since the past two decades when it formulated the E-Commerce Directive of 2000 (EC Directive) to prevent fragmentation of rules applicable to e-commerce businesses across the EU and create an enabling framework for these businesses to thrive.174

With a view to speed up market integration within the EU, the EC Directive sought to reduce legal uncertainty by measures such as limiting the liability of digital service providers including platforms175, providing them access to the market without prior authorisation and so on.176 However, the EC Directive was not formulated with the platform economy of today in mind177 and it loosely covered a broad array of digital businesses.

In addition to the EC Directive, e-commerce companies in the EU are governed by general competition law applicable in the EU. The primary law (other than merger control) is provided in article 101 (concerted practices that restrict competition) and article 102 (abuse of dominant position) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Articles 101 and 102 correspond broadly to sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Competition Act.

Apart from general competition law, the legislative framework for e-commerce platforms complementing the EC Directive comprises a number of instruments including:

- the General Data Protection Regulation, which covers the free movement and processing of personal data, while ensuring protection of personal data as a fundamental right;

---


175 The EC Directive classifies a wide variety of digital service providers including platforms as “Information society services” which are understood as services normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services – Article 2, EC Directive.


the EU P2B Regulations, which impose obligations on platforms that take on the role of an intermediary. Pursuant to the EU P2B Regulations, the EC has also published non-binding guidelines for online platforms on how to improve transparency of their ranking parameters.178

**EU P2B Regulations**

For the purposes of the present Paper, the EU P2B Regulations which came into force in July 2020 are directly relevant.179 These regulations embody regulatory recognition of the increasingly important role digital platforms occupy in today’s economy. The change in regulatory mindset from the year 2000 (when the EC Directive came into force) to 2019 is also evident from the European Commission’s (‘EC’) choice of legal instrument in the form of a Regulation (which is a binding legislative act that must be applied as it is) versus a Directive (which only sets out a broad goal for EU Member States to achieve but allows them to devise their own laws on how to reach these goals).180

However, in spite of recognising the need for nuanced regulations to govern P2B relationships, the EU P2B Regulations tread with caution and in essence tantamount to increased disclosure and transparency obligations without any concrete restrictions on the actions of digital platforms. Perhaps because it was a first mover in the unchartered territory of platform regulation, the EU preferred to adopt a light touch approach. The main features of the EU P2B Regulations in the specific context of E-marketplaces are as follows:

Applicability – Given the global reach of digital platforms, the Regulation applies regardless of whether a platform is established within the EU or outside the EU, provided that two cumulative conditions are met. Firstly, the business users should be established in the EU. Secondly, business users of the platform should offer their goods

---


179 Article 19, EU P2B Regulations.

or services to consumers located in the EU at least for part of the transaction.\textsuperscript{181} Notably, the EU P2B Regulations apply in addition to the laws otherwise applicable to the contract between the business user and the platform.\textsuperscript{182}

\textit{Self-preferring} – The regulations recognise that if the platform directly or indirectly competes with independent business users using its services, it has the ability as well as monetary incentive to discriminate to the disadvantage of independent business users of its platform.\textsuperscript{183} Therefore, in such situations, the platform is required to provide in its terms and conditions of use for business users, an appropriate description of, and set out the considerations for any differentiated treatment, whether through legal, commercial or technical means that it might accord to goods or services it offers itself. The description must particularly cover any differential treatment in \textit{inter alia}, access to data, search rankings and commissions and fees charged.\textsuperscript{184}

\textit{Access to and Use of Data} – The regulations mandate that platforms include in their terms and conditions of contract with business users a clear description of access to and use of data by both, the platform as well as business users.\textsuperscript{185} Such data could include ratings and reviews accumulated by business users on the platform.\textsuperscript{186} It mandates that the description should be provided in a manner that enables business users to determine if they can use the data to enhance value creation. Moreover, platforms are required to inform business users of any sharing of data with third parties. If such sharing of data occurs for purposes which are not necessary for the proper functioning of the platform, the platform must provide reasons for sharing of the data.

\textit{Ancillary goods and services} - Ancillary goods and services are explained to be goods and services offered to the consumer immediately prior to the completion of a transaction initiated on a platform to complement the primary good or service being offered by the business user.\textsuperscript{187} Examples of ancillary services include repair services and financial products such as car rental insurance offered with a primary service such as rental of a car. Article 6 of the EU P2B Regulations mandates platforms offering ancillary goods or services to set out in their terms and conditions a description of the type of ancillary goods and services being offered including whether and under what conditions a business user is allowed to offer its own ancillary good or service.\textsuperscript{188}

\textit{Platform parity/ Most-Favoured Nation Clause} - If a platform restricts the ability of business users to offer the same goods and services to consumers under different conditions through other means, it is required to state the grounds for such restriction in its terms and conditions and make those grounds available to the public as well.\textsuperscript{189}

\textit{Internal Complaint Handling System and Mediation} – Platforms are required to establish a free-of-cost internal complaint handling system which provides redress to business users in a transparent and timely manner\textsuperscript{190} as well as a provision for mediation. The platform is required to bear a reasonable proportion of the cost of mediation. Relief from the provisions regarding an internal-complaints handling system as well as mediation are envisaged for smaller platforms.\textsuperscript{191}

\textit{Code of conduct} – Platforms, organisations and associations representing them, together with business users, including SMEs and their representative organisations are encouraged to formulate codes of conduct taking account of the specific features of the various sectors in which platform services are provided, as well as of the specific characteristics of SMEs.\textsuperscript{192}

\textit{Enforcement} – The obligation to ensure effective enforcement of the EU P2B Regulations is on individual Member States in the EU. Accordingly, each Member State is required to frame its own rules setting out the consequences of infringing the EU P2B Regulations.\textsuperscript{193}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[181] Article 1, EU P2B Regulations.
\item[182] Article 1, EU P2B Regulations.
\item[183] EU P2B Regulations, para 30.
\item[184] Article 7, EU P2B Regulations.
\item[185] Article 9, EU P2B Regulations.
\item[186] EU P2B Regulations, para 30.
\item[187] EU P2B Regulations, para 29.
\item[188] Article 6, EU P2B Regulations.
\item[189] This requirement is limited to disclosure of such restriction and does not change the legality of such restrictions under EU law or the domestic law of Member States of the EU - Article 10, EU P2B Regulations.
\item[190] Article 11 and 12 of the EU P2B regulations.
\item[191] Para 38, EU P2B Regulations.
\item[192] Article 17, EU P2B Regulations.
\item[193] Article 15, EU P2B Regulations.
\end{footnotes}
Monitoring and Review - The onus for monitoring the effect of the EU P2B Regulations on the relationship between business users and platforms is on both the EC as well as Member States. Additionally, a three-yearly review of the EU P2B Regulations is envisaged.

While the EU P2B Regulations seek to address the imbalance in power between platforms and their business users by improving the position of the business users, it assumes a somewhat guarded outlook. In the absence of any actual practical experience with the EU P2B Regulations, some critics have raised concerns as to whether the extensive notification obligations imposed on platforms will result in fairer treatment of business users of platforms.

The Digital Services Act Package

Admirably, the EC’s efforts to regulate the digital economy have continued in full steam even post the EU P2B Regulations. In its February 2020 Communication – Shaping Europe's Digital Future, the EC recognised the significant network effects created by large platforms, and proposed the Digital Services Act Package ('DSAP') with an aim to ensure that the market environment remains fair for all market actors. While it is only a proposal at this stage and it may take a while before the DSAP becomes an enforceable legislation, it is a significant step forward and demonstrates growing consensus among regulators worldwide to check the swathing power wielded by certain platforms.

The DSAP comprises of the Digital Services Act ('DSA') and the Digital Markets Act ('DMA'). The DSA focusses on issues such as liability of platforms for third party content, safety of users online, asymmetric due diligence obligations for different platforms depending on the nature of the societal risks services provided by it. Whereas the DMA deals with economic imbalances, unfair business practices by gatekeepers and their negative consequences, such as weakened contestability of platform markets.

194 Article 16, EU P2B Regulations.
195 Article 18, EU P2B Regulations.
199 The DSAP is proposed to apply alongside the E-Commerce Directive and replace some of its provisions.
200 The proposals will be discussed by the European Parliament and the EU Member States via the Council of the European Union. The European Parliament and the Council will first agree on their own versions of the DSA and the DMA. The European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU will then need to reach an agreement on a final text before the regulations will be adopted. It may take a number of years before the rules are adopted, implemented and become enforceable.” - Allen and Overy, 'The Digital Services Act package is here' (Allen and Overy Publications, 16 December 2020) <https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/the-digital-services-act-package-is-here> accessed 1 June 2020.
201 The objectives of the DSA are beyond the scope of our research and are therefore not discussed further in this Working Paper. For example, proposed obligations, such as the requirement for E-marketplaces to conduct due diligence of sellers it hosts, which are targeted at protecting consumers are outside the purview of this Working Paper. However, while devising the statutory final list of obligations, such obligations must be studied and incorporated as may be required.
202 DMA, page 3.
*The Digital Markets Act is part of the Digital Services Act Package proposed by the EC in February 2020. It is not an enforceable legislation at present.

For the purposes of this Working Paper, we will focus on the DMA since the main aim of the proposed regulation is to increase contestability and fairness of markets in which gatekeeper platforms operate. In the context of this Paper, some of the most important provisions of the DMA are as follows:

**Applicability** - The DMA applies only to those platforms that meet clearly defined criteria for qualifying as a ‘gatekeeper’. It applies to ‘core platform services’ provided by a gatekeeper to business users or end users in the EU, irrespective of the place of establishment or residence of the gatekeeper. Services provided by E-marketplaces are recognised as ‘core platform services’ in terms of article 2(2) of the DMA read with article 2(3) of the EU P2B Regulations.

**Designation as a ‘gatekeeper’** – The following qualitative criteria have been proposed for a provider of core platform services to be designated as a gatekeeper:
- it has a significant impact on the internal market;
- it operates a core platform service which serves as an important gateway for business users to reach end users; and
- it enjoys an entrenched and durable position in its operations or it is foreseeable that it will enjoy such a position in the near future.

There is a rebuttable presumption of fulfilment of the above criteria if certain quantitative thresholds based on turnover, market capitalisation or its equivalent fair market value and number of active users are met. The DMA sets out criteria that must be considered by the EC while assessing arguments to rebut the presumption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation of P2B issues in E-marketplaces in the EU</th>
<th>The EU P2B Regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applicable to platforms established within or outside EU as long as a) the business users are based in EU and b) they offer goods or services to consumers located in the EU for at least some part of the transaction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposes transparency and disclosure obligations on platforms without any concrete restrictions on their anti-competitive conduct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable to core platform services provided to business users or consumers in the EU by digital platforms designated as “Gatekeepers”, irrespective of place of establishment of the platform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulates anti-competitive conduct such as self-preferencing and MFN clauses. Imposes obligations such as data portability, data sharing, and mandatory notification of all combinations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

203 Article 1(2), DMA.
204 Article 3(2)(c), DMA.
205 Article 3(2), DMA - the requirement in point (a) where the undertaking to which it belongs achieves an annual EEA turnover equal to or above EUR 6.5 billion in the last three financial years, or where the average market capitalisation or the equivalent fair market value of the undertaking to which it belongs amounted to at least EUR 65 billion in the last financial year, and it provides a core platform service in at least three Member States.
- the requirement in point (b) where it provides a core platform service that has more than 45 million monthly active end users established or located in the Union and more than 10,000 yearly active business users established in the Union in the last financial year.
- the requirement in point (c) where the thresholds corresponding to point (b) were met in each of the last three financial years.
presented by a platform that crosses the thresholds. These include - entry barriers derived from network effects and data driven advantages, analytics capabilities, business user or end user lock in and the market structure.\textsuperscript{206}

The onus is placed on the platform to notify the EC once it breaches the thresholds. Moreover, the EC is also permitted to designate a provider of a core platform service that does not fulfil the quantitative thresholds as a gatekeeper pursuant to its own market investigation provided such platform fulfils the qualitative criteria.\textsuperscript{207}

Interestingly, a particular subset of rules are also applicable to gatekeepers providing core platform services that do not yet enjoy an entrenched and durable position but are foreseen to enjoy such a position in the near future.\textsuperscript{208} This only includes obligations that prevent a platform from achieving an entrenched and durable position in its operations, such as provisions preventing unfair leveraging, and those that facilitate switching between and usage of different platforms.\textsuperscript{209} The EC is required to regularly review whether such obligations should be maintained, suppressed or adapted.\textsuperscript{210}

\textbf{Review of gatekeeper status and obligations} - The EC is empowered to \textit{suo moto} or based on a request, review the gatekeeper designation accorded to a platform.\textsuperscript{211} Such a review is mandatory every two years and the list of gatekeepers is to be published on an ongoing basis.\textsuperscript{212} Further, in cognisance of the dynamic nature of digital markets the EC is permitted to assess whether the list of obligations addressing unfair practices by gatekeepers should be reviewed and additional practices should be identified.\textsuperscript{213} Such assessments are to be based on market investigations to be run in an appropriate timeframe.\textsuperscript{214} This approach balances the need for agility to ensure the \textit{ex-ante} effect of the DMA with legal certainty required by businesses.

\textbf{Platform parity/ Most-Favoured Nation Clause} - The DMA proposal notes that MFN clauses have a significant deterrent effect on the business users of gatekeeper platforms in terms of their use of alternative platforms, limiting inter-platform contestability, which in turn limits choice of alternative platforms for end users. Therefore, it seeks to ensure that business users of gatekeeper platforms can freely choose alternative platforms and differentiate the conditions under which they offer their products or services to their end users.\textsuperscript{215} Restriction on MFN clauses extends to any measure with equivalent effect, for example increased commission rates or delisting of the offers of business users by a platform.\textsuperscript{216}

\textbf{Self-Preferencing} - E-marketplaces which also act as retailers on their own platform are specifically singled out in the proposal.\textsuperscript{217} To prevent gatekeepers from unfairly benefitting from their dual role, the DMA seeks to debar them from using any data that is not publicly available to offer similar services to those of their business users.\textsuperscript{218} The proposal also recognises the potential for self-preferencing by E-marketplaces which may accord their own products or services a preferred rank in search results or prominence in display on their e-shop.\textsuperscript{219} The proposal notes that in such cases gatekeepers have the ability to undermine directly the contestability for third-party products or services on their platform, to the detriment of such third party business users.\textsuperscript{220} Therefore it prohibits gatekeepers from engaging in any form of differentiated or preferential treatment in ranking\textsuperscript{221} whether through legal, commercial or technical means, in favour of products or services it offers itself directly or indirectly.\textsuperscript{222} Moreover, the conditions that apply to such ranking must also be generally fair and non-discriminatory.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{206} Article 3(6), DMA.
\textsuperscript{207} Article 3(6) read with Article 15, DMA.
\textsuperscript{208} Article 15(4), DMA.
\textsuperscript{209} Article 15(4) and para 27, pages 20-2, DMA.
\textsuperscript{210} Article 15(4) and para 27, page 21, DMA.
\textsuperscript{211} Article 4, DMA.
\textsuperscript{212} Articles 4(2) and 4(3), DMA.
\textsuperscript{213} Article 17, DMA.
\textsuperscript{214} Article 17 and Article 3(6), DMA.
\textsuperscript{215} Article 5, DMA.
\textsuperscript{216} DMA, para 37, page 22.
\textsuperscript{217} DMA, para 43, page 24.
\textsuperscript{218} Article 6(1a), DMA.
\textsuperscript{219} DMA, para 48, page 25.
\textsuperscript{220} DMA, para 48, page 25.
\textsuperscript{221} In terms of the DMA, ‘Ranking’ should in this context cover all forms of relative prominence, including display, rating, linking or voice results.
\textsuperscript{222} DMA, para 49, page 26.
\textsuperscript{223} Article 6(1)(D), DMA.
**Data portability** - The proposal mandates that effective portability of data generated by business users and end users through their use of the platform must be provided so that users may exercise data portability options in line with the EU General Data Protection Regulation.\(^{224}\)

**Data sharing** – Platforms are required to share with business users all data generated or inferred from activities of the business user on the platform. The platform must also enable the business user to seek consent, if required under law, from end users for such data sharing.\(^{226}\)

**Mandatory pre-merger notification** – A gatekeeper platform is required to notify proposed mergers with any entity operating in the digital sector irrespective of whether it breaches merger control thresholds applicable in the EU or in individual Member States of the EU.\(^{227}\)

**Enforcement** – Once it becomes law, compliance with obligations and procedures imposed under the DMA are enforceable by means of fines and periodic penalty payments.\(^{228}\) In case of systemic non-compliance, the EC has the power to impose, pursuant to a market investigation, behavioural and structural remedies.\(^{225}\) Structural remedies, such as legal, functional or structural separation, including the divestiture of a business, or parts of it, are to be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. The EC can suspend or exempt application of obligations under the DMA for certain gatekeepers under specific circumstances.\(^{230}\)

**Interface between the DMA and competition law** – The proposal for the DMA clarifies that it addresses unfair practices by gatekeepers that either fall outside existing competition rules, or that cannot be as effectively addressed by competition rules.\(^{231}\) The DMA proposal highlights that the law on abuse of dominance is “not sufficient to deal with all the problems associated with gatekeepers, given that a gatekeeper may not necessarily be a dominant player, and its practices may not be captured by Article 102 TFEU if there is no demonstrable effect on competition within clearly defined relevant markets.”\(^{232}\) Another shortcoming of competition law highlighted in the proposal is that it does not always allow intervening with the speed that is necessary to address issues in digital markets in a timely manner.\(^{233}\)

In sum, tools under the DMA are intended to complement the existing competition law and minimise the detrimental structural effects of unfair practices ex-ante, without limiting the ability to intervene ex-post under competition law.\(^{234}\)

### The UK

The regulation of e-commerce in the UK is set out in a number of different statutory instruments. While some are specific to the nature of the online business, others apply uniformly to all online business activities.\(^{235}\) In the specific context of E-marketplaces operating in the UK, prior to Brexit, notable statutory instruments applicable were the EC Directive and the EU P2B Regulations. Presently, their applicability is subject to modifications notified by the UK Government post Brexit.\(^{236}\) Additionally, competition aspects in relation to E-marketplaces

---

\(^{224}\) Article 6(1)(h) and para 54, page 27, DMA.
\(^{225}\) Sharing includes providing business users, or third parties authorised by a business user, free of charge, with effective, high-quality, continuous and real-time access and use of aggregated or non-aggregated data. – Article 6(1)(d), DMA.
\(^{226}\) DMA, para 55, page 27.
\(^{227}\) Article 12, DMA.
\(^{228}\) Articles 26 and 27, the DMA.
\(^{229}\) Article 16, DMA.
\(^{230}\) Articles 8 and 9, the DMA.
\(^{231}\) DMA, page 3.
\(^{232}\) DMA, page 8.
\(^{233}\) DMA, page 8.
\(^{234}\) DMA, page 3.


\(^{236}\) The UK Government has notified the EC Directive no longer applies to the UK - Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 'The E-Commerce Directive and the UK' UK Government (January 2021) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-e-commerce-directive-and-the-uk> (accessed 1 July 2021); The UK Government has notified the Online Intermediation Services for Business Users (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, in lieu of the EU P2B Regulations - The Online Intermediation Services for Business Users (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/796/contents/made> accessed 1 July 2021. It is to be noted that despite UK’s exit from the EU, recognizing the importance of the EU P2B Regulations, the Digital Market Taskforce has made recommendations to the UK Government to provide for a stronger enforcement mechanism of the said P2B regulations- Competition and Markets Authority, 'A
are regulated under the UK Competition Act, 1998, whose enforcement is entrusted with the Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’).

In light of growing concerns of concentration in the digital economy, the Government of UK and the CMA have taken proactive steps towards designing a regulatory regime to effectively regulate large incumbents. Notably, in 2018, the Government of UK established an independent group of experts chaired by Jason Furman (‘the Furman Committee’), to study and make recommendations towards making digital markets competitive and contestable. This was followed by setting up of the Digital Markets Task Force (‘the Taskforce’) to build on the recommendations in the Furman Committee Report and to aid in the design and implementation of a new pro-competitive regime for digital markets. The CMA also conducted a market study into online platforms and digital advertising, which culminated into a report that was released in July 2020. Based on the abovementioned studies on competition issues in the UK digital economy, the UK Government announced a new ex-ante regime for regulating incumbent technology giants to inter alia ensure that businesses transacting with such giants are fairly treated. The proposed regime, which is a culmination of the recommendations of the Furman Committee, the Taskforce and the CMA, hinges on adopting a pro-competitive framework targeted specifically at entities that have attained ‘Strategic Market Status’ (‘SMS’). Enforcement of the new regime will be entrusted to the proposed Digital Markets Unit (‘DMU’) within the CMA. The following sections briefly illustrate the notable features of the proposed regime.

**Designation of SMS entities**

The proposal sets out a targeted pro-competitive framework that will be applicable to only those entities that attain the SMS threshold. The aim of this threshold is to effectively regulate entities that are in a position to give consumers more choice and control over their data, and ensure businesses are fairly treated.

---

236 Competition and Markets Authority, Online platforms and digital advertising market study (UK Government, July 2020)
237 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, ‘New competition regime for tech giants to give consumers more choice and control over their data, and ensure businesses are fairly treated’ ( Press Release, 27 November 2020)
238 Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Appendix B: The SMS regime: designating SMS firms’ (Taskforce Advice Appendix B) (December 2020)
239 Digital Markets Taskforce, Furman Committee, CMA market study
240 Designation of entities with SMS status
241 Ex-ante pro-competitive framework for SMS entities
242 A dedicated Digital Markets Unit within the CMA
exercise market power over a gateway or bottleneck in a digital market, irrespective of their statutory non-dominance.

The status is to be designated by the DMU based on a two-step assessment. First, an evidence based economic assessment of whether an entity has "substantial and entrenched market power" in relation to a specific digital activity and, second, whether that power provides the entity with a strategic position. Importantly, the Taskforce recommends E-marketplaces to be prioritised for SMS designation in the guidance by the DMU.

In assessing whether an entity has substantial and entrenched market power, the Taskforce recommends that the DMU considers factors such as the availability of alternatives, scope for entry and expansion of new players, degree of innovation in the market and the ease of switching for consumers. It is important to note that both the CMA and the Taskforce have recommended against the delineation of relevant market in such assessment as it does little to recognize the interconnected nature of digital markets. The Taskforce instead recommends focussing on specific activities undertaken by the entity that have a similar function or which, in combination, fulfil a specific function.

For the purposes of assessing whether an entity has a 'strategic position', the Taskforce sets out a list of non-exhaustive factors to be evaluated which includes the entity’s size and scale, its bargaining power in a specific market segment, its gatekeeping function, its ability to define the rules of the game within its own ecosystem and also in practice for a wider range of market participants, and the extent to which the entity can leverage its market position from one market segment to another through the development of an ecosystem of services.

Interestingly, more than one activity provided by an SMS entity can be recognised as a ‘designated activity’, so that a single SMS entity could have multiple designated activities. While the proposed code of conduct and pro-competitive interventions will apply to only the specific designated activity, the mandatory merger notification requirement will apply to the SMS entity as a whole.

**An ex-ante pro-competitive framework**

Substantively, the proposed regime counts on a robust ex-ante pro-competitive framework to be made applicable to SMS entities only. The framework is focussed on preventing anti-competitive harms as opposed to the extant framework that primarily relies ex-post remediability. This framework is envisaged to have three pillars: an enforceable code of conduct that SMS entities are to abide by; empowering the DMU to make pro-competitive interventions in order to impose structural and behavioural changes upon SMS entities; and mandatory pre-merger notification for qualifying mergers involving SMS entities.

**Code of Conduct**

The proposed regime seeks to put in place a legally enforceable code of conduct that clearly sets out the 'rules of the game' for SMS designated entities. Such a code of conduct is expected to achieve the twin goal of clarifying principally acceptable behaviour for SMS entities thereby preventing them from engaging in behaviour which could undermine fair competition.
The Taskforce has acknowledged the tactical significance of prescribing ex-ante rules in fast-paced digital markets. Such rules are expected to influence SMS entities' decision-making upfront and consequently shape their behaviour proactively.\[^{260}\] Additionally, a clear code of conduct will also enable behaviour by SMS entities to be challenged and remedied more swiftly than is possible through existing laws.

While the exact nature of activities that are permissible and prohibited are to be drawn up by the DMU as a ‘code of conduct’, customized for the SMS entity in question\[^{261}\], the Taskforce has recommended that the code be a three-tiered structure consisting of: Objectives, Principles and Guidance.\[^{262}\] While the objectives will be statutorily prescribed in the code, the principles and guidance will be drawn up by the DMU. The ‘objectives’ will set out the intended purpose the code aims to achieve, ‘principles’ are expected to set the standards of behaviour for SMS entities in order to achieve the objectives and ‘guidance’ is expected to provide clarity to SMS entities on the interpretation of principles.\[^{263}\] The three tiered structure is intended to balance the need for certainty for SMS entities and flexibility for the DMU to quickly react to any unforeseen issues that may arise.\[^{264}\]

**Pro-competitive interventions (‘PCIs’)**

Another ex-ante tool under the proposed regime to regulate SMS entities involves empowering the DMU to impose remedies that promote dynamic competition and innovation but fall outside the scope of the code of conduct.\[^{265}\] In practice, PCIs and the code of conduct are expected to complement each other. As the remedies under the code may be inherently limited to only require entities to change their behaviour such that they are no longer in breach of the code, PCIs may be used to impose a wider range of remedies which may go beyond scope of the code.\[^{266}\]

Resultantly, specific remedies pertaining to personal data mobility, data access and interoperability that may not otherwise be achieved through the code but are critical in driving greater competition and innovation, may be imposed through PCIs.\[^{267}\] In the specific context of e-commerce, PCIs may be advantageous in imposing obligations that compel E-marketplaces and aggregators to provide access to businesses on fair and reasonable terms.\[^{268}\]

**Tighter scrutiny of mergers involving SMS entities**

The UK merger control regime is currently based on a voluntary notification system and the CMA can intervene only if the prescribed turnover or share of supply thresholds are met.\[^{269}\] In light of growing evidence that suggests that the above thresholds may not be particularly reliable in digital markets,\[^{270}\] the Taskforce has proposed a change of approach for certain transactions involving entities with SMS status.\[^{271}\] Accordingly, the proposed regime requires SMS entities to report all its transactions to the CMA and imposes a mandatory pre-merger notification for transactions that qualify certain clear-cut thresholds.\[^{272}\] The consummation of mergers qualifying for mandatory notification is sought to be prohibited prior to clearance.\[^{273}\] Additionally, the Taskforce also recommends the assessment of mergers by SMS entities be cautiously subject to a lower standard of proof of consumer harm to minimize the risk of under enforcement.\[^{274}\]

---

\[^{260}\] Taskforce Advice, page 40.
\[^{261}\] Taskforce Advice, page 34.
\[^{262}\] Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Appendix C: The SMS regime: the code of conduct’ (Taskforce Advice Appendix C) (December 2020) page C4 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fce73098fa8f54d608789eb/Appendix_C-_The_code_of_conduct_.pdf> accessed 1 July 2021.
\[^{263}\] Taskforce Advice Appendix C, page C4; Taskforce Advice, pages 35-36.
\[^{264}\] Taskforce Advice, page 35.
\[^{265}\] Taskforce Advice, page 41.
\[^{266}\] Taskforce Advice, pages 41-45.
\[^{267}\] The Advice of the Taskforce sets out the nature and range of interventions that the DMU may require. With the exception of full ownership separation, the Taskforce recommends that the DMU be empowered to impose structural remedies. It also recommends that the remedies under PCI for the DMU should not be restricted to a set but rather has the flexibility to adapt in line with the market- Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Appendix D: The SMS regime: pro-competitive interventions’ (December 2020) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fce70118fa8f54d58640c7f/Appendix_D-_The_pro-competition_interventions_.pdf> accessed 1 July 2021.
\[^{268}\] Taskforce Advice, page 43.
\[^{269}\] Taskforce Advice, pages 56-57.
\[^{270}\] Taskforce Advice, pages 55-56.
\[^{271}\] Taskforce Advice pages 54-67.
\[^{272}\] Taskforce Advice, page 59.
\[^{273}\] Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Appendix F: The SMS regime: a distinct merger control regime for firms with SMS’ <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fce706ee90e07362d20986f/Appendix_F-_The_SMS_regime-_a_distinct_merger_control_regime_for_firms_with_SMS-_web_.pdf> accessed 1 July 2021.
The establishment of the DMU

The proposed regime envisages the establishment of a unit dedicated to digital markets within the CMA – the DMU.275 This unit shall be responsible for enforcing the new regime swiftly and in a time-bound manner, given the pace of digital markets.276 It is expected to establish itself as a centre of expertise for digital markets with the capability to understand the business models of digital entities, including the role of data and the incentives driving how these entities operate.277 Apart from designating SMS entities and enforcing the code of conduct, the role of the DMU will also extend to monitoring ongoing market trends, proactively engaging with competition regulators in other jurisdiction to facilitate better monitoring of SMS entities278 and working closely with stakeholders.279

The Taskforce, noting the multiplicity of statutory instruments and regulators at play in regulating digital markets, has highlighted the compelling need to weave together a coherent regulatory landscape for digital markets, one that avoids duplicity of efforts between regulators and facilitates the sharing of expertise across regulators.280 To this end, the Taskforce has recommended that the DMU work closely with other regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority and bodies such as the Digital Regulation Co-operation Forum which comprises of the CMA, the telecom regulator Ofcom and the Information Commissioner’s Office.281

Germany

The regulation of e-commerce in Germany is set out both under German and EU laws.282 In the specific context of E-marketplaces, notable laws include the Telemmedia Act, 2007, the EC Directive and the EU P2B Regulations. Additionally, aspects pertaining to competition and consumer protection are domestically regulated under the Act Against Unfair Competition, 2004,283 and the Act Against Restraint of Competition, 1958 (‘ARC). The enforcement of the ARC is entrusted to the Bundeskartellamt, also known as the Federal Cartel Office (‘FCO’).

Germany has been active in recognizing the challenges that the digital economy poses to small players and merchants, both at the enforcement284 and legislative/policy levels.285 In line with its commitment to preserve a competitive process and create a level playing field for small businesses operating on E-marketplace platforms, the German parliament in January 2021 passed the 10th amendment to the ARC (‘the Amendment’), which particularly targets the regulation of large platforms.286 The Amendment, also referred to as the ‘Digitization Act’

276 Taskforce Advice, pages 24-25.
277 Taskforce Advice, pages 22-23.
278 Taskforce Advice, page 79.
279 Taskforce Advice, pages 47, 51 and 52.
280 Taskforce Advice, pages 22-23.
282 The statutory instruments include the German Civil Code, 1900, the German Trust Services Act, the Act Against Unfair Competition, the General Data Protection Regulation and Data Protection Act 2018, the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.
285 The FCO has released a plethora of working paper series and reports that have shaped German competition enforcement in digital markets. Additionally, both the 9th and 10th amendments to the ARC have been targeted at effectively regulating digital markets. Through the 9th amendment to the ARC, it was expressly clarified that transactions where no monetary consideration is paid in a market are also subject to competition law. Further, aspects that are critical for the market power of platforms and networks (such as network effects and access to data) have been introduced into the law as new criteria for determining market power. The 9th amendment also provides for notification of mergers based on the value of transactions, thus enabling high value digital transactions to be covered within the regulatory scrutiny of the FCO. Bundeskartellamt, ‘Amendment of the German Act against Restraints of Competition’ (Press Release, 19 January 2021) (FCO Press Release on the 10th Amendment) <https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/EN/Economicsectors/Digital_economy/digital_economy_node.html> accessed 1 July 2021.
is a culmination of the recommendations of the ‘Competition Law 4.0’ commission which was set up by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy to draw up key action points for German competition law in light of the rapidly evolving digital economy.\(^{287}\)

At present, the Amendment along with the EU P2B Regulations is expected to effectively promote fair play between large e-commerce platforms and businesses that operate upon them. In the particular context of regulating P2B relationships, the Amendment seeks to empower the FCO to enhance its scrutiny of certain designated large digital platforms,\(^{288}\) as illustrated in the following sections.

---

**Designation and targeted regulation of entities with Paramount Significance for Competition Across Markets (‘PSCAM’)**

The Amendment through the addition of section 19a to the ARC has created a new label for large platforms that connect distinct user bases and are consequently active on multiple sides of a given market.\(^{289}\) Given their role as infrastructural facility and their strategic position in the digital ecosystem, the Amendment considers undertakings that fulfil the criteria under sections 18 (3a) and 19a (1) to have paramount significance in preserving competition.\(^{290}\) Indicators of undertakings with PSCAM include a dominant position in one or more markets, access to data, financial strength, vertical integration and position of a company in related markets, a company’s role in facilitating third parties’ access to supply and sales markets and its related influence on the business activities of third parties.\(^{291}\) Section 19a of the ARC adopts a calibrated approach, making it clear that

---


\(^{288}\) FCO Press Release on the 10th Amendment.

\(^{289}\) FCO Press Release on the 10th Amendment.


\(^{291}\) Section 19a (1), the ARC.
the legislature’s intent is to regulate only the most powerful and large entities. Notably, the term PSCAM is similar to how a gatekeeper is defined in the DMA.

The PSCAM status is to be designated through a declaratory order, and such PSCAM entities shall in turn be subject to increased scrutiny under the ARC for up to five years as elaborated further in the forthcoming sections. Such a designation is particularly important as it empowers the FCO to carry out ex-ante regulation by making timely interventions and pass prohibition orders against certain practices of such entities without formally establishing ‘dominance.’

Enumeration of prohibited conduct by PSCAM entities

In order to clarify the type of behaviour that is unacceptable by large platforms, the Amendment has inserted section 19a(2) to the ARC enumerating the types of conduct that the FCO can prohibit PSCAM entities from engaging in. Conducts that may be specifically prohibited owing to the entity’s strategic importance and resources include self-preferencing, anti-competitive tying and bundling, unfair terms and conditions that act as barriers to entry for other competitors including anti-competitive processing of data and refusal of interoperability and data portability. The prohibited conduct is largely similar to the obligations proposed under the DMA.

It is to be noted that a rebuttable presumption operates against the prohibited conduct unless the PSCAM entity concerned objectively justifies its conduct to the FCO under section 19a of the ARC. In effect, the 19a(2) acts as ‘blacklist’ of prohibited conduct unless proven otherwise by the PSCAM entity in question.

Abuse of dominance and relevant market power

Unilateral anti-competitive behaviour is governed by sections 18, 19, 20 and the newly introduced 19a of ARC. Section 19 prohibits an entity from abusing its dominance either singularly or collectively with other entities. Additionally, in line with Germany’s commitment to ordoliberalism, protection of small market players assumes primary importance and so the ARC also prohibits the abuse of ‘relative market power’ under section 20 of the ARC. An entity is understood to have relative or superior market power if other players in the market are dependent upon the entity either as supplier or consumer without adequate alternatives. Entities with such superior market power are subject to certain specific obligations that apply to dominant entities as laid

---

References:

292 FCOPress Release on the 10th Amendment.
294 Section 19a, the ARC. FCPRESS Release on the 10th Amendment.
296 Section 19a(2), the ARC.
298 Section 19a(2), the ARC. FCPRESS Release on the 10th Amendment.
299 Section 19a, the ARC; FCO Press Release on the 10th Amendment.
302 Section 18, 19 and 20, the ARC.
304 Section 20, the ARC.

down under section 20(3) of the ARC, thereby enabling the FCO to effectively regulate gatekeepers despite their statutory non-dominance.

The Amendment further broadens the scope of assessing market power of an entity by including factors such as network effects, possession of competitively sensitive data and switching costs while determining market power in multi-sided markets. Similarly, the Amendment also allows the FCO to consider the importance of the intermediary services provided by the entity in the downstream and upstream markets while assessing the market position of an undertaking acting as an intermediary in multi-sided markets. The Amendment also expands the scope of protection for entities that transact with entities which are not dominant but possess 'relative market power'. Prior to the Amendment, protection against entities with 'relative market power' was only available to small and medium-sized companies. Lastly, the Amendment empowers the FCO to mandate access to data to dependent companies for adequate compensation and to proactively intervene when the behaviour of large platforms makes the market prone to 'tipping'.

**Procedural amendments**

Underscoring the importance of agility in regulatory action in new age markets, the Amendment also lowers the threshold for the FCO to issue ‘interim orders’. Interim orders can be especially helpful in preventing PSCAM entities from carrying out potentially anti-competitive conduct resulting in irreparable harm, before the FCO reaches a final decision on the permissibility of such conduct. However, such interim measures shall not apply in case PSCAM entities can prove that the order would cause “unfair hardships not justified by overriding public interests”.

Additionally, the Amendment provides for speedier disposal of cases in relation to PSCAM entities’ conduct. Per the Amendment, appeals against decisions issued by FCO under section 19a of the ARC will be directly brought before the Federal Court of Justice, Germany’s highest antitrust court, thus enabling the by-passing of all intermediate stages.

**Increased scrutiny of concentrations**

The insertion of section 39a of the ARC through the Amendment has empowered the FCO to demand a notification for every concentration by certain large undertakings in specific sectors even if such concentrations do not meet the notifiability thresholds under section 37 of the ARC.

Prior to making a notification demand, the FCO is obligated to conduct an inquiry in the sector the undertaking belongs to in accordance with section 32e of ARC and it may thereafter pass a formal order, valid for up to three years, demanding notices of future concentrations from the undertaking. The newly inserted section 39a may

---

308 Sec 18(3a), the ARC.
309 Sec 18(3b), the ARC.
311 Section 20(1a), the ARC; FCO Press Release on the 10th Amendment.
313 Section 32a, the ARC; FCO Press Release on the 10th Amendment.
314 Section 32a, the ARC.
315 Section 32a, the ARC.
317 Section 73(5), the ARC, FCO Press release on the 10th Amendment.
318 Section 39a, the ARC.
319 Section 39a (1) of the ARC lays down the characteristics of the undertaking whose concentrations are sought to be scrutinized.
320 “(1) The Bundeskartellamt may order by formal decision that an undertaking is to notify every concentration with other undertakings in one or several specific sectors of the economy if
1. the worldwide turnover of the undertaking concerned was more than EUR 500 million in the last business year,
2. there are objectively verifiable indications that future concentrations could substantially impede effective competition in Germany in the sectors of the economy specified, and
3. in Germany, the undertaking supplies or procures at least 15 per cent of the goods or services in the sectors of the economy specified.”.
321 Section 39a, the ARC.

## Australia


The primary focus of the inquiry was to study the impact of digital platforms such as online search engines, social media and digital content aggregators on competition in the media and advertising services markets.\footnote{ACCC Report, page 132.} While the ACCC Report does not specifically examine issues pertaining to E-marketplaces,\footnote{ACCC Report, page 140.} the observations of the ACCC are nonetheless significant in identifying the issues prevalent in P2B relationships. Particularly, the report takes note of the inevitable dependence\footnote{ACCC Report, pages 162-164.} of small businesses upon platforms to reach a major segment of consumers,\footnote{ACCC Report, pages 497-501.} thus making such platforms a ‘gateway’\footnote{ACCC Report, page 109.} for business users to carry out trade. Additionally, the ACCC acknowledges the asymmetry in bargaining powers between large platforms and small businesses.\footnote{ACCC Report, pages 140-142.} It notes that a superior bargaining position has encouraged platforms to be less transparent about their offerings, particularly with respect to issues of pricing and data collection, and conversely notes how the lack of such negotiating power of business users has the potential to lead to unfair contract terms,\footnote{ACCC Report, pages 32, 255-257} as business users would likely continue to use their services despite these issues due to the lack of viable alternatives.\footnote{Treasury Laws Amendment (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code) Bill, 2021 (‘Bargaining Code’). The code is intended to address perceived bargaining power imbalances between news service providers and large platforms by setting certain minimum standards such that platforms are expected to adhere to and by enabling news services to provide their content via other electronic means.\footnote{Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ‘Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report’ (ACCC Report) (2019) <https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20-final%20report.pdf> accessed 1 July 2021.} That way, businesses would have multiple options to choose from, thus making such platforms a ‘gateway’ for business users to conduct transactions.}

In addition to the above, given Australia’s voluntary merger notification regime, the ACCC Report recommends that large digital platforms intending to acquire any business with activities in Australia, must give advance notice of the same to the ACCC and allow it sufficient time to review the proposed acquisition.\footnote{ACCC Report, page 132.} The report also recommends the establishment of a dedicated branch within the ACCC to build expertise in digital markets regulation.\footnote{ACCC Report, page 1.}

Taking cognizance of the recommendations made in the ACCC Report,\footnote{ACCC Report, page 162.} in February 2021, the Australian Government passed an amendment to the CCA, 2010, through the Treasury Laws Amendment (News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Bargaining Code) Bill, 2021 (‘Bargaining Code’).\footnote{ACCC Report, page 1.} The code is intended to address perceived bargaining power imbalances between news service providers and large platforms by setting certain minimum standards\footnote{ACCC Report, pages 32, 255-257} that such platforms are expected to adhere to and by enabling news services to

\f
collectively negotiate and secure a fair price for their news content. At present, the Bargaining Code is specifically made applicable to Google and Facebook which have been assessed to have substantial market power, the equivalent of dominance, under the CCA, 2010.

Although the Bargaining Code does not apply to P2B relationships in the context of e-commerce, it nonetheless marks an important step in promoting fair play between business users and incumbent platform giants through ex-ante regulatory instruments.

Japan

Competition law in Japan is governed under the Anti-Monopoly Act, 1947 ('AMA, 1947') enforced by the Japan Fair Trade Commission ('JFTC'). The JFTC has been proactive in monitoring the impact of digital platforms to the Japanese economy and studying the corresponding regulatory developments required. In February 2021, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry ('METI') enacted the Improvement of Transparency and Fairness of Digital Platforms Act, 2021 ('TFDPA'), which specifically aims to take measures for securing transparency and fairness in trading on digital platforms.

In line with its international counterparts, the TFDPA also relies on ex-ante monitoring of ‘Specified Digital Platforms’ (‘SDPs’), expected to be designated based on their size and the nature of service provided. Such SDPs are in turn bound by certain obligations that govern their transactions with business users including transparency regarding the sharing of aggregated consumer data with business users, the particulars of differential treatment as extended to affiliated business users, and the primary factors used to determine search ranking. The SDPs are to also carry out periodical self-assessment of their business practices and submit reports to the METI. Reportedly, the TFDPA is expected to be accompanied with additional regulations and guidelines for the purposes of implementation.

Additionally, noting the need for swifter regulatory actions, the Japanese Government has also established the Headquarters for Digital Market Competition in September, 2019 consisting of domain experts and ministry representatives. It is evident that Japan’s efforts to regulate large digital platforms involves ex-ante statutory instruments and a specialized digital markets body.
The US

The chief federal statutory instruments governing antitrust regulation in the US are the Sherman Act, 1890, ('Sherman Act') the Clayton Act, 1914 ('Clayton Act') and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 1914 ('FTCA'). The Sherman Act prohibits every contract, conspiracy or combination that restrains trade or commerce and prohibits monopolisation and any attempt to monopolise. The Clayton Act on the other hand, prohibits and addresses any harm that could potentially arise from certain practices that are not specifically prohibited under the Sherman Act such as mergers and acquisitions that may significantly lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. The FTCA regulates "unfair methods of competition" as well as unfair or deceptive acts or practices and further authorises the creation and establishment of the Federal Trade Commission ('FTC'). The FTC and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice ('DOJ') are jointly entrusted with the enforcement of the aforementioned laws. Notably, although the FTC has previously claimed that the extant US antitrust laws have stood the test of time as they have been applied "from a time of horse and buggies to the present digital age", from the developments discussed below it is evident that there is an admitted need to sharpen regulatory tools in the context of digital markets.

Cognizant of the rising power of digital giants, the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Judiciary Committee ('the Subcommittee') launched an investigation in 2019 in order to examine the rise and use of market power online and assess the adequacy of existing antitrust laws and current enforcement levels in digital markets. Based on their investigation, the Subcommittee observed that certain digital platforms - Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google - have attained a 'gatekeeper' position over key distribution channels which enables them to control access to markets and effectively choose winners and losers in that market. The Subcommittee specifically noted that by engaging in anti-competitive practices such as self-preferencing, predatory pricing and exclusionary conduct these dominant platforms have exploited their power in order to become even more dominant. Keeping these concerns in mind, the Subcommittee put forward certain recommendations that are aimed at restoring competition in the digital economy. The recommendations proposed by the Subcommittee which are relevant in the context of regulating competition issues in P2B relationships on E-marketplaces include – prohibition on dominant entities from abusing their superior bargaining power, the need to enable access to data through measures such as data interoperability

and portability, introduction of non-discrimination rules to prevent self-preferencing and the need to implement structural separations in certain businesses to further minimize conflict of interest and predatory conduct. Additionally, the Subcommittee has also recommended flagging any acquisition by a dominant entity as ‘presumably anti-competitive’ to ensure scrutiny of all mergers that run the risk of significantly lessening effective competition in the market.

In line with the recommendations put forward by the Subcommittee, the House Judiciary Committee, on 23rd and 24th June 2021, approved six Bills aimed at sharpening the regulation of gatekeeper platforms in digital markets in the US. The six Bills and their relevant features are:

- **H.R. 3843, the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2021** - aimed at amending the present filing fee structure for pre-merger notification by increasing filing fees on larger transactions while reducing filing fees on smaller transactions, in order to ensure that mergers that are most likely to consume time and resources pay more than those that place less of a burden on the FTC and DOJ.

- **H.R. 3460, the State Antitrust Enforcement Venue Act of 2021** - aimed at reducing costs and time associated with pursuing certain antitrust cases.

- **H.R. 3849, the Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (‘ACCESS’) Act of 2021** - seeks to authorize the FTC to establish new pro-competitive rules that enable interoperability and data portability. Importantly, these obligations are intended to be made applicable to platforms designated as ‘covered platforms’, by taking into account features such as the number of registered consumers and business users, market capitalization and the platform’s ability to restrict or enable access to the market within which it operates.

- **H.R. 3826, the Platform Competition and Opportunity Act of 2021** - seeks to prohibit certain acquisitions by dominant online platforms such as acquisition of companies that compete with the ‘covered platform’ and potential competitors.

- **H.R. 3816, the American Choice and Innovation Online Act** - aims to curb abusive conduct such as discriminatory and self-preferencing practices that result in unfair treatment of business users who are similarly placed. This Bill is also sought to be made applicable to ‘covered platforms’, understood in accordance with the ACCESS Act.

While the aforementioned Bills will have to undergo scrutiny at multiple levels before they acquire the force of law, they demonstrate legislative recognition of the need to strengthen ex-ante competition law scrutiny of digital markets, and consequently of E-marketplaces. To plug this gap, the Bills recommend introduction of both substantial and procedural changes to the extant US competition law regime. In line with the global trend, the new statutory instruments sought to be introduced recognize gatekeeping platforms, their polarizing abilities and their ability to carry out novel abusive practices towards business users, and aim to selectively regulate them in order to improve contestability and bargaining asymmetries in markets where such platforms exist.

**China**

Competition law in China is primarily governed under the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 enforced by the State Administration of Market Regulation (‘SAMR’). The SAMR is vested with the powers to investigate, and adjudicate infringements of the AML. The AML prohibits monopoly agreements and abuse of dominance, and regulates merger activities.

In line with the global regulatory trend, the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council has recently issued the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Platform Economy, 2021 targeted at sharpening regulation of Chinese technology giants, including E-marketplaces. In the specific context of improving competition issues in P2B relationships, the AML Guidelines impose certain obligations upon dominant entities which include prohibition of exclusivity obligations or restrictions precluding business users from dealing with rival platforms, personalized pricing and price discrimination, refusal to supply, tying or bundling through technical means and novel forms of abuse such as search downgrades and traffic restrictions. It is also interesting to note that the manner in which ‘dominance’ is to be ascertained under the AML Guidelines 

---


specifically factors in the financial resources of the platform, the level of competition in the market and the
degree of dependence of other users on the said platform.399

Additionally, the AML Guidelines also seek to cast a wider net in order to scrutinize certain mergers involving
platforms. Particularly, the AML Guidelines seek to subject transactions involving ‘variable interest entities’,
entities where the actual controlling party does not own shares of the operating entity, but achieves de-facto
control of such entity through a series of agreements.390 to merger scrutiny in China.391 The AML Guidelines also
empower the SAMR to investigate mergers below statutory turnover thresholds, notably those transactions
involving acquisition of start-ups or emerging platforms.392 Further, recognizing that many platforms employ
business models involving zero or low priced products, the AML Guidelines lay down certain criteria in order to
direct the manner in which ‘revenue’ is to be calculated.393

Reportedly, in August 2021, the SAMR has issued a another set of draft rules for public consultation that seek
to inter alia ban fake reviews and unfair competition on platforms including on E-marketplaces.394 These draft
rules are yet to be finalized.395

In light of the changing landscape of the digital economy, the SAMR has been proactively launching investigations
to scrutinize the conducts of Chinese E-marketplace giants in light of P2B competition issues.396 The SAMR
launched an investigation to probe the conduct of e-commerce retail giant Alibaba concerning allegations of
imposition of obligations upon its business users to exclusively use Alibaba’s platform to trade their products.397
The SAMR imposed a record fine of USD 2.75 billion on Alibaba.398 Similarly, Meituan, a food delivery platform,
was reportedly fined USD 1 billion for compelling its business users to use its platform exclusively.399

From the above, it is evident that Chinese competition law and its enforcement authorities are actively taking
cognisance of and responding to P2B competition issues emerging in E-marketplaces.

399 Article 11, Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for Platform Economy Industries’ (Anjie, 2021)
399 Zhourng Lun Law Firm, ‘China Signals VIE No Longer an Obstacle in Merger Filing’ (Lexology, 29 October 2020),
399 Stephen Crosswell and others, ‘China issues Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Internet Platform Economy’ (Lexology 11 February 2021)
399 Stephen Crosswell and others, ‘China issues Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Internet Platform Economy’ (Lexology 11 February 2021)
399 Stephen Crosswell and others, ‘China issues Anti-Monopoly Guidelines for the Internet Platform Economy’ (Lexology 11 February 2021)
399 China’s new draft rules to further tighten control on tech sector’ Aljazeera (17 August 2021);
399 ‘China’s new draft rules to further tighten control on tech sector’ Aljazeera (17 August 2021);
399 ‘China’s new draft rules to further tighten control on tech sector’ Aljazeera (17 August 2021),
399 Fay Zhou and others, ‘China: SAMR joins ranks and sends a strong signal for digital markets’ (Linklaters, 7 January 2021)
399 Alexander Svetlichni, ‘China’s antitrust penalty for Alibaba: reading between the lines’, Kluwer Competition Law Blog, (14 April 2021),
399 Reuters, ‘China fines Alibaba record $2.75 bn for anti-monopoly violations’ The Economic Times (10 April 2021)
399 Reuters, ‘China’s antitrust regulator to fine Meituan about $1 bln’, The Hindu (6 August 2021)
V. A case for strengthening *ex-ante* P2B competition regulation

As observed in Chapter III, despite the existence of numerous instruments regulating E-marketplaces in India, none of them set the rules of the game for P2B issues comprehensively, especially from a competition lens. Globally, similar regulatory gaps have been addressed or are sought to be addressed by adopting new *ex-ante* competition law tools as discussed in Chapter IV. In this Chapter, we analyse the underlying reasons as to why *ex-post* competition regulation by itself may not be adequate to ensure fairness and contestability in P2B relationships.

First, there is abundant literature that underscores the symbiotic relationship between competition authorities, and sectoral authorities who regulate their sectors *ex-ante*.  

Ex-post competition enforcement works best when complemented with and supported by *ex-ante* regulation. Sectoral regulators, through *ex-ante* regulation, 'set the rules of the game' and competition authorities, through *ex-post* regulation, act as 'umpires of the game'. By way of example, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India regulates telecommunication companies *ex-ante* and the CCI regulates their anti-competitive market conduct such as predatory tariffs *ex-post*. Both regulators have convergent roles in pursuing the same goal of maximizing consumer welfare. The resultant enforcement from a combination of the two approaches effectively regulates the market and sets boundaries for players to operate within. As illustrated in Chapter III, the *ex-ante* regulation of 'E-marketplace platforms' does not fall under the purview of a specific sector or a statute, although aspects of it are regulated in a fragmented manner primarily by the MeitY, DPIIT and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution. Particularly, with respect to P2B competition issues, there appears to be a regulatory vacuum. Arguably, this lack of a streamlined *ex-ante* regulation has not only created a blind spot in the regulation of competition concerns in digital platforms but has also compromised the efficacy of *ex-post* regulation. For example, since there were no predetermined rules set by a specific ministry or regulatory body, developing an understanding of the nuances of working of digital platforms and what amounts to acceptable or non-acceptable, harmful or pro-competitive conduct was a time consuming process for an *ex post* regulator such as the CCI. Moreover, there appears to be a lack of clarity as to which regulator or ministry is to assume regulatory charge over anti-competitive conduct of digital platforms in India.

Second, *ex-post* enforcement does not always lead to optimal restoration of competition in evolving and fast paced markets, especially involving gatekeepers. As noted by the UK’s Ofcom, *ex-ante* regulation is specifically required for those entities that act as gatekeepers but may "escape the legal/economic definition of dominance (although they have the clear potential to become dominant)" and where "end users of services faces significant switching costs in moving to another supplier or service". Further, as evidenced by the recent US House Judiciary Committee’s investigations into giants such as Apple, Google, Facebook and Amazon, investigations into incumbent players in digital markets can be resource-intensive and time-consuming. In the meanwhile, the market may irreversibly tip in favour of the incumbent and consequently drive out competitors. The resultant harm both to the market and competitors may be irreparable.

Third, *ex-post* competition investigations are an *ad hoc* solution, as they are limited to the narrow claims made in each specific case. They may do little to address similar anti-competitive conduct arising in regard to same entity’s

---


405 As illustrated in chapter IV, the antitrust investigation into the five major big-tech companies launched by the US House Judiciary's Subcommittee spanned over a year and is an example of the time-consuming nature of such investigations. The various press releases, reports and opinions sought from experts during such investigations may be accessed here- House Committee on the Judiciary, ‘Antitrust Investigation of the Rise and Use of Market Power Online and the Adequacy of Existing Antitrust Laws and Current Enforcement Levels' (2019) <https://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=14921> accessed 1 July 2021.
conduct in a different / associated market or a different entity's conduct resulting in the same issues as investigated. When an entity's behaviour or problems raised by different entities are in a recurring pattern, addressing them through *ex-ante* regulation results in significantly increased administrative efficiency.

In light of the above limitations, it is evident that maintaining status quo does not suffice as a policy response and such structurally polarized markets possess limited ability self-correct. An obvious alternative seems to be recourse to a complementary *ex-ante* competition framework for E-marketplaces: one that sets the rules for such platforms to play by and thereby ensures that the market remains fair and contestable. As discussed in Chapter IV, this approach finds support in the developing regulatory practices of many jurisdictions which espouse the use of *ex-ante* competition intervention as a complementary tool in addition to the existing *ex-post* competition law framework, to effectively tackle anti-competitive behaviour by large incumbent platforms in digital markets.

---

404 Google has been subject to repeated antitrust scrutiny by the CCI in different relevant markets - Umar Javeed and Ors v. Google LLC and Ors. 2019 SCC OnLine CCI 42, where the primary relevant market in question was the market for licensable smart mobile device operating systems in India and in - Matrimony.com Limited and Ors. v. Google LLC 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 1, where the relevant markets in question were the markets for online general web search and online search advertising services in India.

405 The CCI has noted, for instance, that self-preferencing is a recurring concern - CCI E-commerce Market Study.

VI. The way forward: Questionnaire for recommendations

Based on our findings in this Working Paper we believe that there is much to be gained from overhauling our regulatory approach to E-marketplaces. Increased contestability and fairer markets will not only promote innovation and encourage alternative platforms to come up but also allow small businesses and sellers to derive greater advantage from the growth potential of the platform economy. Ultimately, gains to consumers will ensue in the form of innovative and good quality products and services at cheaper prices.

With the above objective in mind, an informed discussion amongst experts and stakeholders on the questions below will provide a sound starting point to develop a regulatory framework that truly harnesses the potential of e-commerce for India:

Assessment of the Indian e-commerce market

1. Studies and reports from several international jurisdictions as illustrated in the Working Paper highlight the limited ability of markets dominated by digital platforms to self-correct. Most of these countries are actively exploring potential changes to their existing competition law frameworks, having moved beyond the question of “if” to that of “how”. Even in the Indian context, the CCI market study notes that there are high levels of concentration in E-marketplaces pertaining to retail goods, food services and online travel agencies. In this backdrop, it may be observed that the extant scrutiny under sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Competition Act and other extant legal instruments discussed in Chapter III of this Paper, may not be sufficient for the purposes of ensuring fairness in P2B relationships and increasing contestability in services provided by such E-marketplaces. Is this lacuna also evident in practice?

Strengthening existing regulatory tools and adopting new approaches to regulating e-commerce markets in India

2. Given that the e-commerce market in India has characteristics of an oligopolistic concentration as opposed to dominance, the threshold of ‘dominance’, in the particular context of assessing the market power of E-marketplaces may require dilution. Should such a dilution be made through statutory amendments or is it best achieved through nuanced enforcement practices tailored for E-marketplaces? Alternatively, is it feasible to adopt a new threshold altogether? If a new threshold such as ‘Significant Market Status’, ‘Gatekeeper’ or ‘Paramount Significance for Competition Across Markets’ is adopted, how must we devise the criteria to be used to define such a threshold?

3. Globally, there is increasing consensus on the need to introduce substantive ex-ante competition tools to cast a wider net for entities that have not yet attained statutory dominance in order to regulate their conduct. If in line with international experience an ex-ante competition tool is adopted, what form must this take? Options that may be considered include:

   a. A ‘code of conduct’ that clarifies acceptable conduct between operators of E-marketplaces (and possibly other digital platforms) on the one hand and their business users and consumers on the other. The code may comprise of a set of core principles as well as a list of hardwired do’s and don’ts. Such principle-based regulation confers flexibility to update the code of conduct in line with new and innovative business practices. The statutory list of do’s and don’ts could specifically cover practices such as self-preferencing, inclusion of unfair terms and conditions in contracts, deep

---

discounts, anti-competitive tying and bundling, inclusion of wide platform parity/MFN clauses, data interoperability and portability.

b. Alternatively, such an ex-ante tool can take the shape of legislative ‘rules’, which prescribes conduct that is prohibited and mandated for E-marketplaces (and possibly other digital platforms) and their business users as well as consumers. A rule-based approach has the added benefit of conferring certainty and foreseeability thereby enabling stakeholders to orient their business models accordingly. Moreover, for a developing country such as ours, it may be administratively easier, faster and cheaper to enforce a set of hardwired concrete rules.

If not an ex-ante competition framework, what other regulatory responses may be required?

4. Are the current thresholds stipulated in section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002, and the proposed amendments through the Competition Amendment Bill 2020 sufficient to check the ever-growing market power of E-marketplace giants through acquisition of existing competitors and start-ups that may emerge as potential competitors? Should acquisitions by technology giants be considered ‘presumably anti-competitive’ thereby placing the burden of proof on the E-marketplace to prove otherwise?

5. The regulatory scheme of e-commerce in India reveals a pattern fraught with fragmentation. Presently, E-marketplaces are regulated by multiple authorities including the CCI, the DPIIT, MeitY and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution. Has this overlap led to inefficient outcomes in terms of jurisdic-tional conflicts, forum shopping and unintended regulatory vacuums? Is the time ripe to weave together a cooperation mechanism wherein different departments, ministries and regulators are provided a platform to coordinate governance of E-marketplaces? Options that may be considered include:

a. Creation of a unified e-commerce regulator administering competition, commercial, economic, and technical regulation across e-commerce. This approach would augment expertise building but would render the regulator susceptible to regulatory capture given that the e-commerce sector is highly specialised and work in progress. It would also entail significant public expenditure to create a new regulator. If this approach is adopted, it may be noted that in the long term as more and more commerce moves online, the e-commerce regulator may become the de facto authority in charge of regulating commerce in India.

b. Enactment of a consolidated statute on e-commerce governance in India that provides legislative demarcation of the roles of the various existing regulators and departments of ministries in e-commerce governance. Equal or more important than empowering and demarcating responsibilities will be capacity building within existing regulators and ministries.

c. The creation of an empowered unit called the ‘Digital Markets Division’ within the CCI that interacts with other regulators that have a bearing on digital markets regulation, including e-commerce. This division may be developed as a highly specialized wing within the CCI that actively partakes in research, advocacy and enforcement pertaining to competition regulation in digital markets in India.

6. Given that the e-commerce landscape is evolving rapidly, industry participants may have a more nuanced understanding of the systemic risks and challenges posed by digital markets. They may be better placed to pre-empt and respond to new enforcement challenges in the market. In this context, should the concept of “participative antitrust”, where technology companies, government agencies and other stakeholders work collaboratively to establish and fine-tune the rules of the game, be explored? For this purpose, is it feasible to create a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO), whose agenda would be to proactively aid in framing and enforcing standards relating to the conduct of its member entities? What are potential caveats to be kept in mind while creating such SROs as they may be prone to regulatory capture? In the specific case of competition enforcement, is there a risk that the SRO may act as a platform to promote collusion? What should be its composition and responsibilities?

---

